The physical body through the juridical lens: an issue of law of innovation and of innovation in law (XIX-XX cent.)
| Autor | Elisabetta Fusar Poli |
| Páginas | 247-271 |
The physical body through the juridical lens:
an issue of law of innovation and of innovation in law (XIX-XX cent.)
Elisabetta Fusar Poli
1. Coordinates and spaces; 1.1. Languages and contents; 1.2. The “body” as a “ju-
ridical place” in trans-formation; 1.3. Where is the body? Natural law and general
principles of law; 2. Some examples between the nineteenth and twentieth cen-
turies in Italian legal experience; 2.1. Active and passive body in crimes “against
morality”; 2.1.2. Abduction and “forced body”; 2.1.3. Public scandal and private
offences; 2.2. Represented and imagined body; 2.3. “Collective body”: health care
and protection; 3. An in-progress conclusion: cues for further analysis
1. Coordinates and spaces
1.1. Languages and contents
Taking “innovation” and “transition” as coordinates, I am ready to place
myself in a hyperbolic space, where to transfer themes that are, in some ex-
tent, “familiar” to the legal historian, but need to be re-shaped into new de-
scriptive and interpretative geometries.
I will therefore use these given coordinates in a descriptive sense, but also
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they are addressed here.
they appear to be external categories. However, “innovation” and “transition”
present themselves, at a closer look, with multiple and problematic levels of
depth and facets, and seem to be able to connect with each other and tune in
to the legal sphere, revealing unprecedented tracks and paths of study and
analysis.
1 it appears immediately (and not
1 Precious ideas and references in Meccarelli (2018) in particular 19-21. On transition,
(2018).
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ELISABETTA FUSAR POLI
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itself in dialogue with that of “historical contingency”; it is also compatible –
indeed, necessarily connected, in my opinion – with that of “evolution” in its
most recent and prudent re-interpretations, which, in fact, combine the idea
-
tation and exaptation.
with respect to which the dies a quo and the dies ad quem are relevant. It
is a process that goes from a “before” to an “after”, drawing a time frame
-
ing reconstructive choices, on the basis of moments and phenomena that are
themselves transitory (I can imagine, in legal history, laws expressly ruling
a transitional period, bodies or procedures introduced to regulate the tran-
sition from one regime to another, from one system of law to another, etc.),
and which at the same time suggest the transition as a heuristic key. We could
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gation, has an ontological status (it is outlined in the “external” data) and at
the same time epistemological (as a conceptual instrument that performs, in
fact, a heuristic action).
In short: “transition” is not only what in the context declares itself as such,
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ence a “before” and an “after”, which are relevant in the light of the observed
space-time reality and from its protagonists’ point of view. This, obviously on
the basis of the assumption that law is context-sensitive and that a legal his-
torian is above all an “observer” of the context and its main players.2
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cia entre dos puntos de vista que conllevan estrategias cognitivas y discursivas diferentes.
Un punto de vista posterior respecto de lo acontecido, que va del presente al pasado (mira-
(del pasado al presente). Un punto de vista externo, que va de fuera hacia dentro (miramos
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de ambos: el sujeto que, a efectos cognitivos, adopta un punto de vista posterior y externo
respecto de lo acontecido; una abstracción, si se quiere, que usamos para designar el punto
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terminan a quien ocupa esta posición”. Garriga (2020) 8-9. I may add, on this subject, the
other normative discourses and practices became totally porous and context dependent” 16.
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