Monarchical Sovereignty and the Legacy of the Revolution: Constitutionalism in Post-Napoleonic Germany
| Autor | Markus J. Prutsch |
| Cargo | European Parliament |
| Páginas | 177-203 |
!
!
MONARCHICAL SOVEREIGNTY AND THE LEGACY OF
THE REVOLUTION: CONSTITUTIONALISM IN POST-
NAPOLEONIC GERMANY1
Markus J. Prutsch
European Parliament2
Abstract: Could monarchical claims for personal government be realistically
reconciled with the legacy of the Revolution? This dilemma of the post-
Napoleonic age gave rise to the concept of a genuinely ‘monarchical’ form of
constitutional rule in Europe, which distinguished itself not only from
absolutism and revolutionary constitutionalism, but also British
parliamentarianism. Focusing on Germany and the states of Bavaria and
Baden in particular, this article examines constitutional debates after 1814,
and especially the role of the French Charte constitutionnelle as the prototype of
‘constitutional monarchism’. Its role in the making of post-1814 German
constitutions is highlighted with a view to assessing the Charte’s actual
significance vis-à-vis other potential models, and identifying parallels as well as
dissimilarities between the constitutional systems in France and the German
states. In result, the paradigmatic role of the Charte for (Southern) German
constitutionalism is confirmed; yet at the same time, fundamental differences
are discernible with regard not only to the role monarchical-constitutional
orders played in different national contexts, but also their status within long-
term political developments in different countries.
Keywords: Monarchy; legitimacy; (monarchical) sovereignty; Germany; France;
Bavaria; Baden
I. Introduction
“This is clearly the era of the Constitution”
3
was how the political thinker and
practitioner Karl von Rotteck (1775-1840) characterised his age in 1830, an assessment
equally true for the period immediately after the collapse of the French Empire. Perhaps
the main challenge of the time was how to reconcile European monarchs’ claim to
preserve their sovereignty with post-revolutionary societies’ expectations, especially of a
constitutional state. At the Congress of Vienna – and in contrast to the widespread
perception of the age after 1814 as having been “reactionary” – it was widely felt that the
Spanish approach of rigid neo-absolutism was denying the Zeitgeist and therefore not a
long-term solution.
4
In comparison, the example of the French Restoration under Louis
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 This article is largely based on findings of earlier works, in particular my monograph:
Prutsch 2013.
2 Senior Researcher, Directorate-General for Internal Policies of the Union, European
Parliament.
3 Rotteck 1829-1835 Vol. 2 (1830), p. 172.
4 In his final report on the Congress of Vienna, Talleyrand described the unanimous
disappointment felt by the European powers on the way in which Ferdinand VII had returned
as king to Spain in 1814: “Je n’ai vu aucun Souverain, aucun ministre, qui, effrayé des suites
Revista de Historia Constitucional
ISSN 1576-4729, n.16, 2015. http://www.historiaconstitucional.com, págs. 177-203
!
!
XVIII (1755-1824), who was willing to provide constitutional guarantees to achieve a
lasting settlement, seemed a much more appropriate and reasonable solution. It
therefore comes as no surprise that the Bourbon Restoration project in 1814 was, as
the Revolution itself had been, an act of European importance; an act which might now
serve as a key to overcoming the revolutionary epoch permanently. The Charte
constitutionnelle (“Constitutional Charter”) played a pivotal role in this context: it was
the foundation stone of the new regime and put forward possible solutions to reconciling
the diverging aspirations of rulers and post-revolutionary society.
5
Indeed, the new
monarchical-constitutional system made the monarch the dominant political power and
declared him the sole holder of the pouvoir constituant, yet at the same time restricted
the sovereign by a written constitution providing civil liberties and allowing citizens to
partake in the political and legislative process. For this reason, the ‘constitutional
monarchism’ exemplified by the French Charte, which might justifiably also be termed
‘monarchical constitutionalism’,
6
has frequently been considered to be a model for post-
Napoleonic Europe in general and Germany in particular.
Indeed, there are good reasons to suppose that the Charte played a decisive
‘model-role’ for nineteenth-century Germany, which was facing particular challenges. At
the end of French supremacy, political expectations were running high in the German
states, while the governments of these states sought to counter the national movement
through top-down policies. However, the success of any such policies depended upon
their governments’ ability to ‘trade’ constitutional guarantees, or at least promises of the
same, by refusing to make concessions to the national movement. The German Federal
Act, adopted 8 June 1815, thus pledged landständische constitutions for all the member
states of the German Confederation.
7
The Federal Act went hand in hand with the
existing need for political reform, particularly in Southern Germany, namely Bavaria,
Württemberg, Baden and Hesse-Darmstadt. Created out of formerly independent
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
que doit avoir en Espagne le système de gouvernement suivi par Ferdinand VII, ne regrettât
amèrement qu’il ait pu remonter sur son trône, sans que l’Europe lui eût imposé la condition
de donner à ces États des institutions qui fussent en harmonie avec les idées du temps.”
Rapport fait au Roi pendant son voyage de Gand à Paris (June 1815). In: Pallain 1881, pp. 436-
484, citation p. 474. Indeed, this critical opinion was soon to be confirmed, for only six years
after the advocates of the 1812-Cadiz-Constitution had been forced into exile, the revolution
started in Spain.
5 Charte constitutionnelle (4 June 1814). In: [BL] 1814-1848 Vol. 1 No. 133, pp. 197-207.
6 Anderson/Anderson 1967, p. 39f., p. 78f. The use of the term ‘monarchical
constitutionalism’ has a long tradition in German constitutional law (monarchischer
Konstitutionalismus), namely as a synonym for the actual constitutional development of
Germany and particularly of Prussia in the nineteenth century. See, e.g., Hintze 1911, p. 360f.
However, ‘monarchical constitutionalism’ and ‘constitutional monarchism’ respectively also
aptly characterise the constitutional situation in France and other states after 1814. More
recent studies have taken a wider view of the meaning of these terms (see Kirsch 1999b), to
also encompass Bonapartist regimes and constitutional monarchies dominated by parliament
(such as the English system from 1689 onwards). In this study, however, the terms are used
solely to characterise constitutional systems in which the leadership role of the monarch is
uncontested (“monarchischer Konstitutionalismus mit Vorrang des Königs”; Ibid., p. 7).
7 Deutsche Bundesakte vom 8. Juni 1815. Art. 13: “In allen Bundesstaaten wird eine
Landständische Verfassung statt finden”. In: Huber 1978 [1961], pp. 84-90, citation p. 88. The
German noun Landstände or Landtag – the corresponding adjective being landständisch –
traditionally signifies the assembly of (feudalistic) representatives of the estates of the realm,
called together to advise and pass legislation.
Markus J. Prutsch
178
Para continuar leyendo
Solicita tu prueba