Terrorismo suicida en Indonesia

AutorRohan Gunaratna
Páginas45-77

Page 45

Other people seek life, then they die. We seek death, then we have a better life forever.

Imam Samudra, AlJemaah Al Islamiya's (JI) Bali bombing mastermind commenting on the philosophy of martyrdom.

1. Introduction

One evening in a remote hilly area in Banten, Indonesia, in October 2005, a closing ceremony was held to mark the conclusion of an AlJemaah Al Islamiya (JI) training course conducted for Indonesians, Malaysians and Pattani Muslims.1 An electric generator lighted the venue and the meeting lasted from 7-9 in the evening. It was not the first time JI had conducted training in Banten, a well-known JI hub.2 Page 46

Addressing the gathering, a JI leader said: «The time for jihad has arisen. We can see clearly that our enemies America and its Allies are hanging around us. Americans have killed not only combatants but also the civilian women and children. So it is time to strike them back in every place we can find them back. At least one of you can kill two Americans. At its best, one of you can kill ten. In order to kill them, it is inevitable that you will become a syahid... [martyr]»3

«But we do not have enough bombs. Not all of you can attain martyrdom [shahid]. So please be patient. Please wait a short time and pray to Allah so that we will soon have enough number of bombs or weapons. As the number of bombs currently available is 120, another 180 will not get the opportunity in future to attain martyrdom at this time.»4 Then the JI master of ceremonies announced 120 aliases of those who signed up as martyrs. As the rest had a good understanding of curriculum, they had volunteered to be trainers. Among the speakers at the event were Zulkarnean alias Daud, the military commander of JI, Noordin Mohamed Top, the JI strategist, Abu Amar, leader of JI faction, Abu Sidik, Mukhliansah, and Jaja.5 This single event demonstrated the nature and scale of threat, especially employing suicide attacks against Western targets in Southeast Asia.

1.1. The Context

The politico-religious ideology of jihad has been growing steadfastly since Indonesia's return to democracy. In Southeast Asia, particularly in Indonesia, the chief proponent of this ideology is JI. Led by Abu Bakar Bashir, the JI is responsible for popularizing a politico-religious ideology of jihad and martyrdom. Also the leader of the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (The Indonesian Mujahidin Council), Bashir was imprisoned and he has been released in June 2006. Although Bashir has publicly disassociated himself with JI, he has not condemned the acts of violence perpetrated by JI members. Like Bashir, several ideologues of jihad have exploited the political space and the opportunity to portray martyrdom as the ultimate sacrifice. Nonetheless, the only group that has mounted suicide attacks in Indonesia is JI.

Operationally and ideologically, JI is close to Al Qaeda. Like Al Qaeda, JI is of the view that the United States of America, its allies and friends are attacking Islam and Muslims. Therefore, JI ideologues state that it is their religious duty to wage Page 47 jihad or holy war against the aggressor. Without exception, almost all the targets attacked by JI suicide bombers have been Western targets in Indonesia. Like Al Qaeda and other jihad groups, JI calls death in jihad as Syahadah or Istisyhad (martyrdom) and the person who die as shahid (martyr). In context, the usage of the terms «death» and «suicide» are forbidden.6

This study is based on interviews with JI leaders, members and supporters, intelligence debriefings, police interrogations and recoveries from JI and other jihadist safe houses.

2. Background

JI is a breakaway group of Darul Islam (DI), a group that has steadfastly fought for the establishment of an Islamic state. The Darul Islam struggle, spearheaded by DI, the primordial group, started as a local jihad. After JI became operational in the 1990s, the threat began to shift from the near enemy to the distant enemy. The nationalist character of the Darul Islam struggle was gradually replaced by a powerful religious sentiment. The suicide bombers of Bali I referred to the Darul Islam struggle but the bombers were clearly driven by the idea of global jihad. For instance, Acong, one of the two Bali bombers in October 2002 said:

There is plenty of work that needs to be done in the name of our struggle and pray today that my actions will grow to lay the seeds for the growth of the mujahids. Today I have proven that I am a son of DII/NII (Darul Islam Indonesia/Negara Indonesia Islam), who is ready to sacrifice my life in the name of Islam. Remember fellow mujahidins, our imam SM Kartosuwirjo during the beginning of our struggle in the past, has proclaimed that freedom begins with oneself and one's life. Not by relaxing and being complacent like we are now if we are serious about having success in our struggle. NII today is in the grave and the ashes of man have been poured over it so man is not ashamed to face God. I am ready to face Allah, and admit to be the son of DII/NII. Dear brothers, don't be distracted by the activities of the others and continue to strengthen the brotherhood of martyrs. We must stand shoulder to shoulder in our struggle, God willing, my brothers, we will be ready as we were before. Strive towards getting the wisdom that has been planted by Jainal, Bisbi, Naseh, Didih h. Sabip, Ajak Tinang, Yudi, Aan, Dayat, Asman, Musih who have taken this deliberations and actions because this is the responsibility of us all that we must be accountable for in the hereafter. Please convey my pain as my legacy and my last wish to my brothers. Page 48

Peace be upon you.

Acong

On the land of jihad

Allah is great

Allah is great

Allah is great.7

Although Acong's last will reflect both secular and religious passages, the motive of the bomber was clearly religious. Nonetheless, for the purpose of propaganda and sustaining support, the last will was framed in the context of a local struggle. Although the powerful global jihad ideology subsumed the local jihad ideology, the need for relevance hence support ensures that they constantly refer in their propaganda to the Indonesian local context.

With the exception of a small number of DI factions, DI has abandoned the use of violence to achieve an Islamic state. JI remains the only DI faction actively using violence. Nonetheless, JI co-opted members of Negara Islam Indonesia (NII), the DI faction in West Java and Mujahidin Kompak - to mount suicide attacks. JI is the only group in Indonesia with the conceptual and the physical infrastructure to sustain periodic suicide attacks. As JI has not been designated as a terrorist group, JI ideologues disseminate propaganda, recruit, indoctrinate, and mentor Muslim youth to become suicide attackers. The operational knowledge and the ideological inspiration to mount suicide attacks are becoming widespread. It is very likely that other jihadist groups will also adopt this attack tactic preferred and popularized by JI. Through Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI), an umbrella group created by Bashir, JI;s ideology especially the ideology of jihad is becoming pervasive.

3. Contemporary Period

Since December 2000, JI has predominantly concentrated on striking local Christian and Western targets and not Indonesian government targets. Prior to US-led coalition intervention in Afghanistan, JI and Al Qaeda considered mounting joint operations in Southeast Asia. At the behest of Al Qaeda, JI worked closely with Al Qaeda to mount attacks against Western targets in Southeast Asia notably in Singapore and the Philippines. However, as no Southeast Asian nationals were willing to become martyrs, Al Qaeda identified and assigned a number of Arabs. In response to US led coalition intervention in Afghanistan in October 2001 and Osama bin Laden's call to attack targets of US, its allies and friends, JI mounted Page 49 four suicide attacks in Indonesia where 7 suicide attackers perished. As a result of the wave of negative publicity of Muslim deaths and suffering in Afghanistan, JI was able to recruit, for the first time, Southeast Asians to become suicide terrorists. In October 2002, two JI suicide bombers detonated in Bali. In August 2003, one suicide bomber detonated at the J.W. Marriott in Jakarta. In September 2004, one suicide bomber detonated at the Australian High Commission in Jakarta. In October 2005, three JI suicide bombers detonated in Bali for the second time

Before its first suicide attack in October 2002, JI had experience of mounting non-suicide terrorist attacks. However, the outcomes were mixed especially many failures. To be precise and effective, JI realized both the need and the benefit to integrate suicide into its mode of attacks. From 2002-2005, JI suicide attacks were both human and vehicle borne. In 2002 and in 2005, JI considered using a maritime borne as well as motorcycle borne suicide attacks respectively.

Within JI, its military cells closest to Al Qaeda were responsible for organizing suicide attacks. They belonged to Mantiqi I or Area One, the geographic territory that produced most of the killers. Subsequently, after Mantiqi I was dismantled by Singapore and Malaysia, JI formed laskar khos or a suicide unit that spearheaded the organization for mounting suicide attacks. Through a network of radical clerics, the JI...

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