Impact of the economic crisis on catalan government finances
| Autor | Núria Bosch Roca |
| Cargo | Professor of Public Finance and Director of the Chair in Fiscal Federalism at the Barcelona Institute of Economics (IEB), University of Barcelona |
| Páginas | 1-18 |
IMPACT OF THE ECONOMIC CRISIS ON CATALAN GOVERNMENT FINANCES*
Núria Bosch Roca**
Abstract
The purpose of this article is to analyse the impact that the economic crisis, which began in 2007, and the scal
consolidation policies subsequently adopted have had on the nances of the Catalan government (Generalitat of
Catalonia). The crisis seriously affected the Generalitat’s tax revenues, mainly the Property Transfer Tax linked to the
real estate sector. The scal consolidation policies applied on the revenue side have been determined by the taxing
power of the Generalitat, which has no regulatory power over major taxes, except Personal Income Tax (IRPF), and
very limited powers with regard to tax administration, which means the Generalitat’s nances are subject to the advance
payment system. Consequently, there has been a signicant reduction in Catalan government expenditure, which has
hit the welfare state services (health and education). Financial expenditure, on the other hand, increased considerably
by generating decit and debt. It may therefore be concluded that spending cuts on basic services have not only been
caused by the crisis but also by the shortcomings of the regional nancing model and the decit targets set by the central
government, lower than what would correspond to the Generalitat’s responsibilities.
Key words: economic crisis; scal consolidation; public decit; debt; indebtedness.
INCIDÈNCIA DE LA CRISI ECONÒMICA SOBRE LES FINANCES DE LA GENERALITAT
Resum
Aquest article té per objectiu analitzar la incidència de la crisi econòmica que es va iniciar el 2007 sobre les nances
de la Generalitat de Catalunya, així com les polítiques de consolidació scal aplicades. La crisi va afectar greument
els ingressos impositius de la Generalitat, principalment l’impost sobre transmissions patrimonials lligat al sector
immobiliari. Les polítiques de consolidació scal aplicades pel cantó dels ingressos s’han vist condicionades pel poder
tributari de la Generalitat, sense capacitat normativa sobre els grans impostos, llevat de l’IRPF, i l’escassa capacitat
de gestió tributària, que porta les nances de la Generalitat a estar sotmeses al sistema de bestretes. La conseqüència
de tot plegat va ser una reducció important de la seva despesa, que va afectar els serveis de l’estat del benestar
(sanitat, educació). Contràriament, les despeses nanceres van augmentar notablement per la generació de dècit i
endeutament. Amb tot, es pot concloure que la retallada de la despesa en serveis bàsics no ha estat només a causa de
la crisi sinó també de les deciències del model de nançament autonòmic i dels objectius de dècit xats per l’Estat,
més baixos dels que correspondrien pel volum competencial de la Generalitat.
Paraules clau: crisi econòmica; consolidació scal; dècit públic; endeutament.
* This article is a translation of an original version in Catalan.
** Núria Bosch Roca, Professor of Public Finance and Director of the Chair in Fiscal Federalism at the Barcelona Institute of
Economics (IEB), University of Barcelona, c. Tinent Coronel Valenzuela, 1-11, 08034 Barcelona. nbosch@ub.edu, @nboschroca.
Article received: 23.01.18. Blind review: 20.02.18 and 01.03.18. Final version accepted: 06.03.18.
Recommended citation: Bosch Roca, Núria. “Impact of the economic crisis on catalan government nances”. Revista Catalana de
Dret Públic, Issue 56 (June 2018), p. 1-18, DOI: 10.2436/rcdp.i56.2018.3092.
Núria Bosch Roca
Impact of the economic crisis on catalan government nances
Revista Catalana de Dret Públic, Issue 56, 2018 2
Summary
1 Introduction
2 Stages of the economic crisis in Spain
3 Non-nancial revenues
3.1 Evolution
3.2 Tax revenues and scal consolidation policies
3.2.1 Taxing power of the Generalitat
3.2.2 Evolution
4 Expenditure
5 Public decit
5.1 Evolution
5.2 Cyclical decit and structural decit
6 Indebtedness
6.1 Evolution
6.2 Autonomous Community Liquidity Fund (FLA)
7 Summary and conclusions
References
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Impact of the economic crisis on catalan government nances
Revista Catalana de Dret Públic, Issue 56, 2018 3
1 Introduction
The economic crisis that broke out in 2007 has been long and drawn out. It is now possible to say we have
reached the end of the tunnel but there are still some outstanding issues to be resolved before we can say that
the Spanish economy is in an entirely satisfactory situation.
There have been several stages in the crisis and it has had a highly negative effect on the public purse. The
purpose of this article is, therefore, to analyse what impact the crisis has had on Catalan government nances
and how it has tried to mitigate the effects.
The article has seven sections, beginning with this introduction. The second looks at the two stages into
which the economic crisis experienced in Catalonia can broadly be divided and the main measures adopted
by the central government in each one. In the third section we deal with the Generalitat’s non-nancial
revenues, placing particular emphasis on how the crisis affected its tax revenues and the scal consolidation
measures that were adopted. The fourth section examines the Generalitat’s expenditure throughout the crisis,
as well as the scal consolidation policies applied on the expenditure side. Sections ve and six respectively
examine the evolution of the public decit and the debt. Finally, section seven offers a summary and some
conclusions.
2 Stages of the economic crisis in Spain
The economic crisis did not start in Spain but in the United States, with the subprime mortgages in 2007.
However, it rapidly spread to Europe and Spain, where it burst the property bubble caused by house prices
that were constantly rising above their real value.
It is the collapse of this property boom that gave rise to the crisis in Spain. In fact, it seems that the collapse
might have occurred even without the international economic crisis, given an economic model based
on construction rather than competitive and productive economic sectors. The crisis appeared when the
construction sector, and all the subsectors that depend on it, stopped growing.
The property bubble was fuelled by a policy of easy money. Interest rates were low and mortgages were easily
obtained, very often without any guarantee, although it was believed that the property provided a guarantee
inasmuch as its value was continually increasing. That increased the demand for housing. Immigration and
the purchase of tourist homes were other factors in that increase. As were the land liberalisation measures
adopted by the PP (People’s Party) government.
In fact, the Spanish government did nothing to avoid the boom as it also beneted from the resulting big
increase in tax revenues.
We can highlight the following stages in the crisis experienced:
1st stage: 2007-2009. Although there were signs of a slowdown in 2007, GDP did not grow at a lower rate until
2008, which gave way to negative growth in GDP in 2009 (-3.33%, Table 1). Likewise, the unemployment
rate went from 8.8% in 2007 to 14.9% in 2008 and 19.2% in 20091. During those two years, the Spanish
government under Zapatero decided to tackle this new situation with scal expansion policies. It adopted
scal measures to provide support for families and businesses worth €14 billion and €17 billion respectively,
with a further €29 billion in credit through the Ofcial Credit Institute (ICO).
1 See Arriba, de and Kirby (2014).
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Table 1
Evolution of nominal GDP
(Millions €)
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
CATALONIA 189,854 203,403 209,005 202,028 203,324 200,185 195,209 193,126 196,866 205,017 212,804
SPAIN 1,007,974 1,080,807 1,116,225 1,079,052 1,080,935 1,070,449 1,039,815 1,025,693 1,037,820 1,079,998 1,118,522
% Year-on-
year change
Catalonia 7.14 2.75 -3.34 0.64 -1.54 -2.49 -1.07 1.94 4.14 3.80
Spain 7.23 3.28 -3.33 0.17 -0.97 -2.86 -1.36 1.18 4.06 3.57
Source: IGAE (General State Comptroller).
2nd stage 2010-2013. From 2010, the Zapatero government opted for austerity policies. In 2009, the Spanish
public sector decit reached an all-time high of 11.1% of GDP. Consequently, the directives arriving from
Brussels were aimed at controlling the decit and public debt, to the detriment of growth and employment.
Economic policy gradually switched to deep spending cuts in order to comply with the decit targets set by
the European Union (EU).
The Zapatero government’s rst mistake was to deny there was a crisis at the outset, when all the other
countries were already adopting measures to deal with it. The Spanish government not only acted late but
badly. All that the rst measures adopted did was to increase spending, but not the kind to revive the economy,
which meant it merely created a big public decit. Nor were the necessary structural reforms (labour market,
nancial sector, pension system, public administration and so on) implemented at the time.
EU pressure to control the public decit led to Article 135 of the Spanish Constitution (SC) being amended on
27 September 2011. That was a consequence of the new European scal regulations (the Six-Pack) approved
in 2011. Budgetary stability is based on the structural decit, with the maximum limit set at 0.5% of GDP,
although that may be extended to 1% if public debt is less than 60% of GDP and there is no risk of long-term
nancial instability. At the same time, the regulations require excessive debt to be eliminated at a rate of 1/20
every year over a period of 20 years.
The SC Article 135 amendment therefore entails adopting the above measures. It enshrines the principle
of budgetary stability. It makes it impossible to incur structural decits that exceed those set by the EU. It
also establishes payment of public debt interest and capital as a priority and that the article itself would be
developed in an organic law.
Mariano Rajoy won the general election held on 20 November 2011 but the economic policy of his new
government continued in the same vein, with more cuts and austerity. A notable feature of this Rajoy period
was the approval of the Organic Act on Budgetary Stability and Financial Sustainability (LOEPSF), which
further developed SC Article 135, on 27 April 2012. The LOEPSF establishes the following:
- No public administration may incur a structural decit from 2020 on. However, in the case of structural
reforms, a structural decit for all public administrations of 0.4% of GDP may be incurred.
- It sets a public debt ceiling of 60% of GDP (to be achieved by 2020), split between the three levels of
government: central (44% of GDP), autonomous communities (ACs) (13% of GDP) and local (3% of GDP).
- Public administration expenditure (excluding interest, unemployment benet and spending nanced by
earmarked revenues) may not exceed the medium-term GDP growth rate of the Spanish economy. This
rule will be applied even in the event of more revenues being obtained than those forecast, as those will go
towards reducing the public decit. Likewise, the surpluses produced will go towards repaying the debt.
- It establishes the principle that paying public debt interest and capital before any other form of expenditure
is an absolute priority.
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- It gives the central government the power to set the budgetary stability and public debt targets for all the
ACs and the targets for each one.
The latter point has put severe constraints on AC nances because the central government has set some very
low decit targets, without taking into account the fact they are responsable for welfare state expenditure
excepte for pensions, and this accounts for one third of all public spending. Furthermore, in the event that
ACs do not meet the decit targets, the LOEPSF sets out a series of preventive, corrective and coercive
measures to force them to comply.
To sum up, beginning in 2010 the Spanish government adopted an economic policy of scal consolidation,
rst under Zapatero and subsequently under Rajoy. The measures taken (a reduction in public expenditure,
higher taxes, the introduction of co-payments and restricted access to certain public services, a reduction
in the number of public servants and their salaries, no pension review, etc.) led to a big fall in internal
demand because they were applied in the middle of a recession. The result was negative GDP growth and
more unemployment.2 Zubri (2012) analyses the debate over whether an expansionary scal policy or scal
consolidation is the best way to get out of a recession. Empirical studies show that an expansionary scal
policy leads to an increase in GDP which, in the Spanish case, Zubri quanties a multiplier of around 1.5.
Fiscal consolidation, on the other hand, reduces GDP. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates that
for each consolidation point, GDP contracts by 0.5 percentage points.
Finally, as can be seen in Table 1, GDP did not experience positive growth again until 2014.
3 Non-nancial revenues3
3.1 Evolution
Table 2 shows the Generalitat’s non-nancial revenues and their component parts for the period 2007-2014.
This includes the Generalitat’s entire public sector administration: the various regional ministries, regional
administrative bodies, the Catalan Health Service, the Catalan Health Institute and the Catalan Social
Services and Assistance Institute. The share of local government in State revenues (PIE) and the European
Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) have been excluded from total revenues as the Generalitat plays the
role of intermediary between the payer and the recipient in the case of both these resources.
The non-nancial revenues have been broken down into three components: the resources from the nancing
model, own resources and transfers, excluding those which correspond to the nancing model.
Revenues from the nancing model are based on two pillars: ceded taxes and transfers. Devolved taxes
include those where tax resources are partially ceded (50% of Personal Income Tax-IRPF, 50% of VAT, 58%
of excise taxes (IE)) and those where it is totally devolved (Wealth Tax, Gifts and Inheritance Tax, Property
Transfers and Documented Legal Acts Tax, Electricity Tax, Gambling Tax and Tax on Certain Types of
Transport.
Own revenues includes own taxes, i.e. those created by the Generalitat, rates and other revenues (except
the Gambling Tax, which comes under nancing model resources), property income and real investment
disposal.
Revenue evolution between 2007 and 2014 was determined by three factors: extra resources provided by the
new regional nancing system introduced in 2009, the economic crisis and the impact of scal consolidation
measures. In this period the Generalitat started from a healthy situation thanks to the tax revenues provided
by the property boom, which was still the context it found itself in in 2007. Non-nancial revenues fell by
1.2% in 2008 due to a fall in tax revenues. However, they increased by 12% in 2009, compared to 2008,
thanks to the new nancing system which provided extra resources. It was only in 2010 that the crisis really
2 See Uxó (2014).
3 For a thorough analysis of Generalitat revenues between 2007 and 2014, and revenue side scal consolidation, see Ministry of
Economy and Finance/Departament d’Economia i Coneixement (2016a).
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began to have an impact and nancial revenues fell, peaking at €20 billion in 2012 thanks to additional
resources from concessions and asset sales.
Table 2
Evolution in the non-nancial revenues of the Generalitat of Catalonia*
(Millions €)
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Financing model 19,921 19,527 21,441 18,538 17,543 17,859 17,998 17,419
% Model / Total 91.47 90.76 89.00 87.00 89.40 88.85 90.77 89.79
Own revenues 459 468 515 571 567 1,251 911 1,062
% Own revenues / Total 2.11 2.18 2.14 2.68 2.89 6.22 4.59 5.47
Transfers ** 1,398 1,520 2,136 2,198 1,513 990 920 919
% Transfers **/ Total 6.42 7.06 8.87 10.32 7.71 4.93 4.64 4.74
Total 21,778 21,515 24,092 21,307 19,623 20,100 19,829 19,400
(*) The revenues are recorded according to cash-ow criterion, which takes into account the year’s advance payment
and the settlements of the previous two years. They include the Generalitat’s entire public sector administration: the
various regional ministries, regional administrative bodies, the Catalan Health Service, the Catalan Health Institute and
the Catalan Social Services and Assistance Institute.
(**) Without taking into consideration those linked to the nancing model, the EAGF and the PIE.
Source: Ministry of Economy and Knowledge/Departament d’Economia i Coneixement (2016a).
The regional nancing model contributes approximately 90% of the Generalitat’s non-nancial resources.
By 2008 and 2009 the crisis had already led to a reduction in the ceded taxes, as can be seen in Table 3, but
an overestimation of the advance payments on the part of the Spanish Ministry of Finance4 and the extra
resources provided by the new model approved in 2009 (€1.995 billion) compensated for the reduction
in tax revenues and, therefore, meant the crisis was no felt until 2010. Moreover, the situation was made
worse in 2011 by the return of negative settlements for 2008 and 2009, €691 million and €2.478 billion
respectively.5The return involved a number of annual payments: €138 million in 2011 and €303 million for
each of the following three years.
Own revenues were less important, no more than 3% of nancial revenues until 2011. Their relative importance
grew from then on (reaching 6.22% in 2012) due to the scal consolidation process, which led to an increase
in property revenues and real investment disposal, as well as user charges increase higher than the general rise
in prices. Property revenues increased in 2012 following changes in the Aigües Ter Llobregat and Túnels de
Vallvidrera i del Cadí management concessions. These resources also increased in 2013 and 2014 as a result of
property sales. Own taxes have a very little weight, among these are two that should be mentioned, the Tax on
Large Commercial Establishments and, from 2013, the Tax on Stays in Tourist Establishments (see Table 3).
Current and capital transfers not included in the nancing model are the third pillar of non-nancial revenues
broken down in Table 2. It shows how their relative weight began to decline in 2011 (down from 10.32% in
2010 to 7.71% in 2011) due to the reduction in transfers from the Spanish State following the introduction of
a policy to curb spending. The main reductions were in current transfers for education and grant programmes,
and for dependent persons, as well as capital transfers for housing and infrastructure.
4 The Ministry of Finance estimates the resources it will transfer monthly in the form of advance payments to the Generalitat for the
following concepts: shared taxes (IRPF, VAT and excise taxes), the Electricity Tax, the Basic Public Services Guarantee Fund and
the Global Sufciency Fund. The advances account for 98% of the forecasts. After two years, when the State knows the denitive
resources of the above concepts, it settles the difference between the denitive amounts and the advance paid in year t-2 with the
Generalitat.
5 The nancing model advances were badly estimated in 2008 and 2009, so the nal amounts were less than the forecast, resulting
in negative settlements.
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3.2 Tax revenues and scal consolidation policies
3.2.1 Taxing power of the Generalitat
In order to assess the scope of the revenue side scal consolidation policies applied by the Generalitat, we
need to know what regulatory powers it has. Mention should be made of Act 22/2009, of 18 December,
which regulates the nancing of ACs and cities with a Statute of Autonomy under the common system and
amends certain tax regulations, as well as Organic Act 3/2009, of 18 December, amending Organic Act
8/1980, of 22 December, on nancing ACs.
ACs have a degree of regulatory power over all totally ceded taxes, except the Electricity Tax. Figure 1
shows which aspects of each totally devolved tax the ACs may take decisions on.
Act 22/2009 establishes the scope of the devolution and the connection points of each of the totally ceded taxes.
These connection points determine the autonomous community that the income from each tax corresponds to.
For example, in the case of taxes relating to property transfers, the criterion used to determine the income that
corresponds to each autonomous community (connection point) is the place where the property is located,
while in the case of personal taxes, the criterion is the habitual residence of the taxable person.
The fully ceded taxes are administered by the Generalitat with the exception of the Tax on Certain Means
of Transport, the Tax on Retail Sales of Certain Hydrocarbons and Electricity Tax.6 The fully ceded taxes
are administered by the Catalan Tax Agency (ATC), as provided for in the Statute of Autonomy, and which
became operational on 1 January 2008.
Figure 1
The Generalitat’s powers over ceded taxes
Tax % Income Regulatory power Administration
Wealth 100% Minimum exemption ATC
Rate
Deductions and allowances in the quota compatible with the
State regulations
Gifts and inheritance 100% Reductions in the taxable base ATC
Tariff
Amounts and pre-existing wealth coefcient
Deductions and allowances in the quota compatible with the
State regulations
Property transfers 100% Tax rate on: ATC
Administrative concessions
Transfers of moveable and immoveable property
Establishment and assignment of real property and guarantee
rights
Leasing of moveable and immoveable property
Deductions and allowances on acts where the ACs are empowered
to set the rate that are compatible with State regulations.
Documented legal acts 100% Tax rate on notary documents ATC
6 Given the particular features of administering it, the State Tax Administration (AEAT) collects all the tax and distributes the whole
amount collected to the ACs, depending on the relative percentage of net electricity consumption.
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Deductions and allowances on documents where the ACs
are empowered to set the rate that are compatible with State
regulations.
Gambling taxes 100% Exemptions AT C
Taxable base
Rate and quotas
Rebates
Accrual
Application of taxes
Certain means of
transport
100% Increase the State tax rates by up to 15% AEAT
Retail sales of certain
hydrocarbons
100% Rate within certain bands AEAT
Autonomous community
tranche of IRPF
50% Personal and family minimum with a band of +/-10% AEAT
Scale applicable to the general taxable base, maintaining a
progressive structure
Deductions for:
- Family and personal circumstances
- Non-business investments and earnings application
- Non-exempt public grants and subsidies received from
autonomous communities, earnings that form part of the saving
tax base
- Increases and decreases in the habitual residence deduction
percentages
- Family and personal circumstances
- Non-business investments and earnings application
- Non-exempt public grants and subsidies received from autonomous communities, earnings that form part of the saving tax base
- Increases and decreases in the habitual residence deduction percentages
ATC: Catalan Tax Agency
AEAT: State Tax Agency.
Source: Catalan Ministry of Economy and Knowledge/Departament d’Economia i Coneixement (2016a), p. 16.
Regarding the regulatory power of AC government over partially ceded taxes, Act 22/2009 refers to the AC
tranche of IRPF and species those areas ACs can decide on: the family and personal minimum, the scale
of the general base tax rate, tax deductions and the habitual residence deduction percentages. ACs have no
regulatory power over VAT or excise taxes (IE).
From the description on the Generalitat’s taxing powers it can be seen that its regulatory power over ceded
taxes is limited, as is its capacity for administering them, which is non-existent in the case of the main taxes,
i.e. those that collect the most resources. Therefore, the weight of resources from ceded taxes over which the
Generalitat has some regulatory power is 58% and only 13% if we take into account the taxes over which it
has administrative power.7 That means it is highly dependent on the Spanish government, as the latter has to
transfer all the resources managed by the State Tax Agency (AEAT) by means of monthly advances of the
estimated collection forecasts (see note 4). If tax revenues grow more than the forecasts during the tax year,
the Generalitat derives no benet until two years later, when the nal tax settlement is made.
7 See Ministry of Economy and Knowledge/Departament d’Economia i Coneixement (2016a), p. 72.
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ACs can also create new taxes, provided they do not tax taxable events taxed by the central government. This
makes it really difcult to nd areas not already taxed by the Spanish State and results in many taxes created
by the ACs being suspended by the Constitutional Court (CC) following appeals by the State because they
intrude on its areas or for other reasons of questionable constitutionality.
3.2.2 Evolution
It should be pointed out that the revenues in Tables 2 and 3 are recorded according to cash-ow criterion,
which takes into account the year’s advance payment and the settlements of the previous two years (see note
4). As has already been said, this system is open to criticism because if there are any increases in the taxes
collected, the Generalitat does not derive any benet from that until two years later. It therefore creates an
imbalance in the economic cycle. This factor needs to be taken into account when it comes to assessing the
evolution of the tax revenues in Table 3.
Table 3
Evolution of the tax revenues of the Generalitat of Catalonia*
(Millions €)
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
DEVOLVED TAXES 16,130 15,566 14,917 12,137 16,954 20,697 16,370 16,786 17,396
VAT 4,187 4,317 3,273 2,439 4,539 6,502 5,047 5,320 5,259
IE 1,370 1,275 1,415 1,465 2,072 2,325 2,106 2,249 2,087
ITP & AJD 3,199 1,743 1,429 1,398 1,232 1,091 1,048 1,275 1,474
IP 454 537 213 13 305 563 431 462
ISD 844 1004 920 659 398 395 347 349 484
IDMT 369 212 143 137 100 73 50 55 69
Electricity tax 207 235 262 280 279 256 274 344 269
Tax on retail sales of certain
hydrocarbons **
311 303 279 273 265 309 83
OWN TAXES 11 13 12 14 14 16 52 58 97
TOTAL TAXES 16,141 15,579 14,929 12,151 16,968 20,713 16,422 16,844 17,493
(*) The revenues are recorded according to cash-ow criterion, which takes into account the year’s advance payment
and the settlements of the previous two years.
(**) Since 2013 it has been included in the Tax on Hydrocarbons (IE).
IE: excise taxes; ITP & AJD: Property Transfers and Documented Legal Acts Tax; IP: Wealth Tax. ISD: Gifts and
Inheritance Tax; IDMT: tax on Certain Means of Transport.
Source: Settled budgets Spanish Ministry of Finance and Public Administrations.
Table 3 shows how tax revenues fell signicantly in 2008, 2009 and 2010, from €16.141 billion in 2007 to
€12.151 billion in 2010. The drop in consumer spending as a result of the crisis cut the resources provided
by VAT by almost 50% between 2008 and 2010. Likewise, the collapse of the property boom particularly hit
the Property Transfers and Documented Legal Acts Tax, which went from €3.199 billion to €1.398 billion
between 2007 and 2010. Furthermore, under Act 4/2008, of 23 December, the Spanish government decided
to discount 100% of the Wealth Tax. The justication for the measure was that this tax contributed little
to redistributive justice as the big wealth owners have instruments for avoiding it. As of 2009, therefore,
disappeared. The Spanish government compensated the ACs with a transfer which, in the case of the
Generalitat, was €537 million, equivalent to the tax collected in 2008. The Tax on Certain Means of Transport
also fell signicantly due to the decline in car sales brought on by the crisis, as did the Gifts and Inheritance
Tax, due to the drop in the value of assets and the measures adopted by the Generalitat to reduce the burden
of this tax, which were stepped up from 2011 onwards.
Thus the downward trend in tax revenues was halted in 2011 and 2012. They reached €16.968 billion in
2011, when the effect of applying the nancing model approved in 2009 was rst felt. In 2009 and 2010, the
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tax resources received were based on the old structure, and it was not until 2011 that the extra resources8 were
consolidated in the new revenue structure, in other words, that the advances corresponding to the ceded taxes
were made according to the share percentages of the new model.9 Thus the share of IRPF, VAT and excise
taxes (IE) collected increased with the new percentages from 33% to 50%, from 35% to 50% and 40% to
58%, respectively. The increase in the IRPF rate approved by the Generalitat in 2010 also came into force
in 2011.
Tax revenues grew again in 2012 and reached €20,713 billion due, once more, to the effect of the 2009
nancing model (in 2012 the Generalitat received the settlements for shared taxes corresponding to 2010, when
the advance payments were still calculated according to the old system in 2009) and the central government’s
scal consolidation policy, which involved increases in VAT and IE. Even so, the increased resources from
these taxes did not represent a real increase in the Catalan government’s resources as the increases were
discounted from the Global Sufciency Fund. At the same time, the Wealth Tax was reintroduced.
However, tax collection fell again in 2013 because the crisis and restrictive scal consolidation policies had
a negative effect on employment and consumer spending, resulting in a signicant fall in the two big central
government taxes, IRPF and VAT.
From 2013, tax revenues began to recover and exceed the amount collected prior to the crisis, in 2007,
reaching €17.493 billion in 2015. Yet, while the Transfers and Documented Legal Acts Tax did recover in
comparison with the worst years of the crisis, the amount for 2015 did not even reach 50% of the gure for
2007, despite the fact that the Generalitat established measures (increase in the rate) to compensate for the
fall. Nor did the Tax on Certain Means of Transport recover its pre-crisis levels, in part due to the fact that
new cars pay less tax.
Regarding its own taxes, the Generalitat has created new ones during this period to increase its resources but
many have been suspended by the Constitutional Court (CC).
Until 2012, the revenues from these taxes basically came from the Tax on Large Commercial Establishments.
That year a €1 surcharge was introduced on medical prescriptions as a dissuasive measure. However, the CC
declared it unconstitutional in Judgement 71/2014, of 6 May, and forced the Generalitat to return the money
collected during the years when the surcharge was in force.
Also in 2013, the Catalan government created the Tax on Stays in Tourist Establishments leading to a notable
increase in its own taxes, which rose from €16 million in 2012 to €52 million in 2013.
Another tax that should be mentioned in this period is the one on bank deposits, also suspended by the CC.
It came into force in 2013 and, as it was levied from 31 December, it started to be collected in 2014. In fact,
that was the only year it was collected. The CC annulled it with its Judgement 107/2015, of 28 May.
A series of environmental taxes also came into force in 2014, chargeable from 2015, namely, those on
nitrogen oxides emissions into the atmosphere produced by commercial aviation; gas and particle emissions
into the atmosphere produced by industry; the provision of content produced by electronic communications
service providers, and the production of nuclear-powered electricity. However, the latter two have been
suspended by the CC.
A tax on vacant housing also came into force in 2015. The Spanish government took it to the CC and it was
suspended for ve months, when the Court lifted the suspension. It is currently pending judgement. Should
it be declared unconstitutional, all the income obtained from the tax would have to be returned, with interest.
Finally, in 2017, the Catalan government created more of its own taxes: the tax on non-productive assets
of legal persons, the tax on carbon dioxide emissions from motor traction vehicles, and the tax on the
environmental risk of the production, handling, transport, custody and emission of radiotoxic elements. The
latter two were suspended by the CC.
8 These resources were €1.995 billion in 2009 and €2.415 billion in 2010.
9 All that was compensated for with resources from current transfers from central government.
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Thus, the Catalan government’s scal consolidation policies have been determined by restrictions on its
taxing power. It has no regulatory power of any kind over the big taxes that are partially ceded, apart from
IRPF. And it has exercised that power by establishing some of the highest marginal rates in the Spanish
State. As the fully devolved taxes are linked to the real estate sector, the amount raised from these has fallen
signicantly, even though the Catalan government has increased the tax rate.
New taxes have repeatedly been created but in many cases they have been met by Spanish government
appeals to the CC, which has then suspended them.
Finally, administering taxes does not help to ensure sufcient revenues either since, due to their being
administered by the AEAT they are subject to the advance payment system which has many defects, as has
been mentioned.
4 Expenditure10
As mentioned in Section 2, government policy at the start of the crisis was expansionary and restrictions on
public spending were not introduced until 2010. That is reected in Table 4, which shows the Generalitat
of Catalonia’s expenditure over the period 2007-2015. It gives the total spending for the Generalitat’s main
functions and, separately, expenditure excluding the “public decit” function (debt amortisation and interest
payments), non-nancial expenditure, interest payments and non-nancial expenditure excluding interest.
That way it is easier to see real spending without the effect of nancial expenditure, which has increased
signicantly due to the economic crisis
Table 4
Generalitat of Catalonia expenditure by functions
(Million €s)
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Basic public services 1,826 2,156 2,296 2,349 2,242 2,115 2,063 2,088 2,182
Social protection and promotion
actions
2,336 2,890 3,445 3,586 3,550 2,970 2,679 2,998 3,325
Production of merit goods 14,620 15,685 19,106 16,441 16,170 14,408 13,636 14,270 16,088
* Health 8,651 9,167 12,164 9,567 9,831 8,729 8,186 8,926 10,294
* Education 5,544 6,065 6,508 6,426 5,963 5,388 5,179 5,067 5,504
* Culture 425 453 434 448 376 291 271 277 290
Economic actions 2,844 4,317 3,754 3,699 3,096 2,542 2,420 2,410 2,534
General actions 6,827 5,798 6,544 6,520 10,236 12,338 16,804 12,378 11,816
* Public debt 1,691 1,328 2,158 2,714 6,304 7,866 10,744 7,609 6,545
TOTAL 28,453 30,846 35,145 32,595 35,294 34,373 37,602 34,144 35,945
TOTAL EXCLUDING PUBLIC
DEBT
26,762 29,518 32,987 29,881 28,990 26,507 26,858 26,535 29,400
TOTAL NON-FINANCIAL
EXPENDITURE
25,721 28,327 32,515 29,411 29,480 26,916 26,495 27,239 29,103
INTEREST PAYMENTS 578 705 797 919 1,479 1,743 1,761 1,923 1,202
TOTAL NON-FINANCIAL
EXPENDITURE EXCLUDING
INTEREST
25,143 27,622 31,718 28,492 28,001 25,173 24,734 25,316 27,901
Source: Settled budgets. Spanish Ministry of Finance and Public Administrations.
Spending grew until 2009, increasing from €28.453 to €35.145 billion between 2007 and 2009, and from
€26.762 to €32.987 billion if expenditure on the “public debt” function is not taken into account. There was
10 For a thorough analysis of Generalitat expenditure between 2007 and 2014, and the scal consolidation policies applied, see
Ministry of Economy and Knowledge/Departament d’Economia i Coneixement (2016b).
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also the effect of the new nancing model in 2009, which enabled a one-off credit to be approved. However,
2010 saw the introduction of scal consolidation policies, due to the fall in tax revenues, and compulsory
compliance with the Budgetary Stability Act, which meant spending on the various policies began to fall,
apart from that included in the “public decit” function, which increased substantially as a result of the
decits generated, and it was not until 2015 that this trend changed.
Beginning in 2008, the European Central Bank cut the intervention interest rate but that did not compensate
for the decits generated and the increase in public debt. Table 4 shows the increase for interest payments,
which tripled between 2007 and 2012-2013, and for the “public debt” function. Debt renancing operations
also increased in those years. All that was to the detriment of other spending policies.
If we analyse expenditure in the “production of permanent public assets” function, which includes spending
policies on health, education and culture, we can see how it fell by €2.665 billion between 2009 and 2010,
from €19.106 to €16.441 billion. It continued to call in the following years, reaching its lowest point of
€13.636 billion in 2013. Then it recovered in 2014 and 2015, reaching €16.088 billion in the latter. However,
it represented 54% of total spending in 2009 and only 45% in 2015, so its relative weight has fallen.
The most important scal consolidation policies pursued from 2010 included the following:
- 2010: restraints on studies, reports and protocol; salaries of senior ofcials frozen.
- 2011: reduction in universal benets for dependent children; staff measures (contributions to the pension
plan for the Generalitat’s public sector workers suspended); 50% reduction in the social action fund;
investments in all areas rescheduled.
- 2012: average 5% cut in the salaries of the Generalitat’s public sector staff, as well as in salary premiums
and fringe benets; cuts in almost all budget items. Likewise, on 15 May that year, an adjustment plan
was approved to reduce spending by €1.5 billion which, among other measures, specied the reduction in
salaries, the rescheduling of investments and the sale of public assets.
The Spanish government subsequently approved two royal decree-laws (RDL) that rationalised spending
on health and education.11 As a result, the Catalan government approved another adjustment of €1.804
billion, of which €1.069 billion were related to the Spanish government’s measures and €735 million were to
reduce transfers and contributions to public sector bodies of the Generalitat, reschedule investments and for
new salary measures. The central government later cancelled the December extra payment to public sector
workers, which subsumed the 5% salary cut planned by the Catalan government.
- 2013 and 2014: suspension of the extra payment maintained; 2013 also saw the application of measures to
adjust the surface rights charges that Catalan government departments pay to Infraestructures de la Generalitat.
In addition to the above measures, others were applied to simplify the Generalitat’s public sector structure,
as well as rationalise and resize government bodies. Various redundancy exercises were also carried out. As
regards investment, the biggest reductions affected Infraestructures Ferroviàries de Catalunya, where it went
from €1.001 billion to €101 million between 2008 and 2014, and Infraestructures de la Generalitat, where it
was reduced from €1.260 billion to €250 million between 2010 and 2014.
5 Public decit
5.1 Evolution
The public decit is calculated in ESA terms, i.e. in accordance with the European System of National and Regional
Accounts, the methodology which has to be used to assess the scal consolidation and adjustment process.
11 RDL 14/2012, of 20 April, on emergency measures to rationalise public spending on eduction, and RDL 16/2012, of 20 April, on
emergency measures to guarantee the sustainability of the National Health System.
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Table 5
Evolution of the decit. ESA 2010. Base year 2010
(Debt-to-GDP ratio %)
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
CATALONIA -0.85 -2.89 -2.51 -4.48 -4.11 -2.27 -2.15 -2.66 -2.84 -0.93
AC AVERAGE -0.32 -1.71 -2.01 -3.17 -3.35 -1.87 -1.58 -1.78 -1.73 -0.84
TARGET -0.02 -0.75 -0.75 -2.40 -0.75 -1.50 -1.30 -1.00 -0.70 -0.70
NB The 2007 target was set as a % of national GDP. From 2008 it was set as a % of regional GDP.
Source: IGAE.
Table 5 shows how the Generalitat’s decit evolved between 2007 and 2016, as well as the average decit for
ACs and the target set by the central government. It conrms the marked increase that occurred in the decit
between 2007 an 2008, when it rose from 0.85% to 2.89% of GDP following the outbreak of the economic
crisis. It improved slightly in 2009, to 2.51%, thanks to the additional resources from the new nancing
model and the higher estimate for the ceded tax advances. However, the crisis made itself felt again in 2010,
when the decit climbed to 4.48% of GDP, the highest gure throughout the period studied. Table 3 shows
how tax revenues were at their lowest the same year.
Fiscal consolidation measures began to be applied in 2010, so the decit started to come down. Despite that,
it rose slightly again in 2014 and 2015 because the forecast income from the sale of public buildings did not
materialise, certain accounting adjustments were made and compliance with the Constitutional Court’s ruling
on the €1 per prescription meant the revenue raised from this tax in previous tax years had to be returned.
The following year, 2016, closed with a decit of 0.93%, much closer to the level it was in 2007 at the start
of the crisis: 0.85% of GDP.
Throughout the period analysed it can be seen that the Generalitat’s decit was higher than the average for all
ACs, even though the trend was the same. It can also be seen that decit target has never been met. However,
it has to be said that the targets set by the Spanish government have been very unfair on the ACs, because
it has passed the decit onto them. If we take into account that they are responsible for the welfare state,
apart from social security, and that they manage a third of all public sector spending, the targets set do not
correspond to their responsibilities.
Therefore, the targets set by the central government and the deciencies of the nancing model are partly to
blame for the Generalitat having been forced to cut spending on the basic services of the welfare state.
5.2 Cyclical decit and structural decit12
The decit can be broken down into cyclical decit and structural decit. The cyclical part of the public
decit is explained by the economic conjuncture. So, taking the cyclical decit from the total decit will
give us the cycle-adjusted decit which, in turn, after subtracting one-off measures, will give us the structural
decit. (Remember that under the Budget Stability and Financial Sustainability Act no public administration
can incur a structural decit from 2020.)
The European Commission has created a method for calculating the cyclical decit based on two variables:
the output gap, which is the difference between actual production and potential output and is expressed as
a percentage of GDP,13 and the sensitivity of the budget balance to the cyclical situation (semi-elasticities),
which shows the response of the public accounts to the economic cycle.
12 See Ministry of Economy and Knowledge/Departament d’Economia i Coneixement (2016c).
13 If the output gap is positive it shows output is above the potential level; if it is negative, it is below the potential level.
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Table 6
Cyclical decit and structural decit
(Debt-to-GDP ratio %)
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Cycle-adjusted decit -3.68 -3.08 -0.90 -0.62 -1.42
Structural decit -3.41 -3.08 -1.89 -0.88 -1.33
Primary structural decit -2.89 -2.20 -0.98 0.13 -0.35
Source: Ministry of Economy and Knowledge/Departament d’Economia i Coneixement (2016c).
Table 6 shows the cycle-adjusted decit, the structural decit and the primary structural decit (structural
decit excluding interest payments) for the Generalitat during the period 2010-2014. The importance of the
one-off measures in 2012 can be seen in the difference between the cycle-adjusted and structural decits.
Between 2010 and 2014, the latter had an average annual adjustment of 0.52%, very close to the 0.5%
recommended by the EU. If the structural decit is measured without interest, the annual average of the
adjustment was 0.6%.
6 Indebtedness
6.1 Evolution
Table 7 shows the evolution of the Generalitat’s debt level between 2007 and 2016 in relation to GDP. In
2007, the debt was €15.776 billion and relatively low at 7.8% of GDP. By 2016, however, it had risen to
35.3% of GDP and stood at €75.118 billion.
The public decit caused by the economic crisis largely explains this evolution and it is noticeable that
the debt seems to have stabilised since 2014 as the economic situation has improved. It should also be
pointed out that changes in how the debt is calculated may explain come increases. These changes are:14 a)
an increase in the number of entities classied as being in the Generalitat’s public sector; b) the inclusion of
nancial operations (factoring and emphyteutic leases) within the scope of ESA which, until then, were not
considered public administration; c) recording public-private transactions under public administration not
previously classied under that heading.
Regarding the Generalitat’s debt in relation to the other ACs, Table 7 also shows the evolution in total AC
debt, similar to that of the Generalitat, and the weight of the latter’s debt in relation to the ACs as a whole. It
can be seen how this weight grew between 2007 and 2011 from 25.5% to 30.2% of total AC debt but fell in
the following years to 27.1% in 2016. It can therefore be deduced from the gures that the Catalan debt is
higher than the average for all ACs.
Table 7
Evolution of the debt according to the excessive debt protocol (EDP)
(Debt-to-GDP ratio %)
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
CATALONIA 7.8 10.0 12.7 17.5 22.0 26.8 30.1 32.7 35.4 35.3
AC TOTAL 5.7 6.7 8.6 11.5 13.6 18.2 20.5 22.9 24.4 24.8
TARGET 29.8 32.7 30.4 35.2
CATALONIA / AC
TOTAL (%)
25.5 28.0 27.5 28.7 30.2 27.7 27.6 27.1 27.6 27.1
Source: Spanish Ministry of Finance and Public Administrations.
14 See Ministry of Economy and Knowledge/Departament d’Economia i Coneixement (2016c).
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However, there are very considerable differences in the debt level between the ACs, which are broken down
in Chart1. The gap extends from Valencia’s debt, which represents 42.7% of its GDP, to 14.2 % in the case
of the Basque Country.
Numerous works can be found which analyse the factors determining the debt and decit levels of the various
ACs.15 The conclusion drawn is that the least indebted are those that benet most from the AC nancing
system and the regional development fund. Thus, Lago (2002) notes that the regions that have received the
most funds have incurred the least debt and made less use of their own taxes.
Those that are subject to Article 151 (of the Constitution) are more indebted because they were given
responsibility for health and education before, and this expenditure, mainly on health, has a very big
expansionary effect.16
Chart 1
42,7
36,5
35,1
29,9
28,5
23,0
22,7
22,3
21,8
20,4
19,0
18,8
18,6
18,1
16,3
14,4
14,2
DEBT ACCORDING TO EDP I N 2016
AS % GDP
Source: Banco de España
6.2 Autonomous Community Liquidity Fund (FLA)
Royal Decree-Law 21/2012 established the Autonomous Community Liquidity Funde (FLA). The increase
in AC debt and its maturities, once the nancial markets had been closed to them, put the ACs in a very
difcult position. The central government therefore set up the FLA, a liquidity fund to help them deal with
their debt maturities.
The Generalitat’s nancial position meant it was forced to join and comply with a series of scal and
nancial conditions. Likewise, each AC has to draw up an adjustment plan that ensures compliance with the
decit targets and reimbursement of the amounts provided by the fund. This plan is updated annually and
monitored by Spain’s Ministry of Finance.
In September 2017, the Generalitat had a debt of €76.381 billion, of which €53.005 billion corresponded to
FLA funding and represented 69% of its debt.
15 See Bosch (2013).
16 See Mussons (2009).
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7 Summary and conclusions
The collapse of the property boom provoked the economic crisis in Spain, which made itself felt primarily
from 2008. Our economic model based on construction rather than competitive sectors, an easy money
policy and the lack of structural reforms were the causes behind its rapid expansion. The crisis can be divided
into two periods: the rst, 2007-2009, when expansionary spending policies were adopted to tackle it but
only made it worse because it was not the type of spending to revive the economy; and the second, 2010-
2013, when the scal consolidation policies imposed by the EU began to be adopted. In this period particular
mention should be made of the amendment to Article 135 of the Spanish Constitution, which enshrines the
principle of budgetary stability, and its subsequent development in the LOEPSF.
Between 2008 and 2009, Catalonia’s GDP fell to a negative growth rate of 3.34% and in 2013 it dropped to
its lowest nominal value of €193.126 billion, whereas it was €209.005 billion in 2008. It began to register
positive growth rates again in 2014 and by 2016 had reached €212.804 billion.
The evolution of non-nancial revenues between 2007 and 2014 was determined by the extra resources
provided by the new regional nancing system introduced in 2009, the economic crisis and the impact of
scal consolidation measures. The crisis really began to be noticed in 2010, because in 2009 its impact was
compensated by the new AC nancing model approved in 2009. While the Generalitat’s nancial revenues
were €21.778 billion in 2007, by 2014 they had dropped to €19.400 billion, despite the scal consolidation
measures adopted to increase them.
The Generalitat’s non-nancial revenues can be broken down into three components: those deriving from the
nancing model, the government’s own revenues and transfers. The nancing system resources contribute
approximately 90% of the Generalitat’s revenues. Despite the fall in tax revenues, these resources did not
start to fall signicantly as a result of the crisis until 2010, due to the effect of the Ministry of Finance’s
overestimation of the advance payments and the additional resources provided by the new nancing model
in 2008 and 2009.
The Generalitat’s own revenues (its own taxes, rates, property income and real investment disposals) were no
more than 3% of non-nancial revenues until 2011. From then on their weight increased (to 5%-6%) because
the scal consolidation policies have led to an increase in property income and income from the disposal real
investments. A tax on stays in tourist establishments was also introduced.
The third pillar of the Generalitat’s non-nancial revenues consists of the transfer of resources outside the
autonomous community nancing model. During the period analysed, their relative weight was reduced due
to the central government’s spending curbs which affected educational programmes and grants, dependent
persons, housing and infrastructure. Thus, between 2007 and 2014, the transfers went from 6.42% of nancial
income to 4.74%.
The crisis signicantly reduced the Generalitat’s tax revenues, which fell from €16.141 billion to €12.151
billion between 2007 and 2010. From that year on they started to recover and reached €17.493 billion in
2015. The scal consolidation policies adopted by the Catalan government to increases its tax revenues
were conditioned by its limited taxing power. It should be pointed out that during the period of this study the
Catalan government increased the marginal rate of IRPF and the Transfers Tax on a number of occasions.
However, as the latter is related to the property sector, there has been no return to the pre-crisis collection
rates. The Generalitat has also created new taxes but many of them have ended up being suspended by the
CC. Nor is achieving tax sufciency helped by the fact that the taxes which raise most are managed by the
Spanish Tax Agency and that money is only available through the advance payment system, which has many
shortcomings and means the Generalitat cannot benet from any increase in the tax collected until two years
later, when the nal tax settlement is made.
As has already been said, the rst stage of the crisis saw expansionary spending policies. Thus, between
2007 and 2009, Catalan government spending increased from €28.453 to €35.145 billion. The one-off credit
from the new nancing model in 2009 also had an effect. But from 2010, spending declined as restrictive
scal consolidation policies were applied. These were brought about by the fall in tax revenues, the increase
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in public decits and the Budget Stability Act. Spending on permanent public assets (health, education and
culture) fell from €19.106 billion in 2009 to €13.636 billion in 2013. From then on it began to recover.
The evolution of non-nancial revenues and expenditure described above explains the public decit seen
between 2007 and 2016. During that period, the Generalitat’s decit was at its highest, 4.48% of GDP, in
2010. From then on the scal consolidation policies reduced it to 0.93% of GDP in 2016. Throughout the
whole period the Generalitat’s decit was above the AC average and the decit target was only met once,
in 2013. It also needs to be said that the Spanish State has passed the decit onto the ACs, setting very low
decit targets difcult for them to meet given the nature of their responsibilities. That may explain some of
the cuts in spending.
The consequence of generating this decit has been to increase the Generalitat’s debt, from 7.8% of GDP in
2007 to 35.3% in 2016. Moreover, in September 1917, 69% of that debt corresponded to funding obtained
through the Autonomous Community Liquidity Fund (FLA).
In 2016, Catalonia was the third most indebted AC. There are many reasons for the Generalitat’s debt but,
apart from the economic crisis, there are studies which show that the most indebted ACs are the ones that
benet most from the AC nancing system and the regional development fund.
In conclusion, we can say that the economic crisis has seriously harmed the Generalitat’s nances but also
that the shortcomings of the nancing system and the central government’s scal consolidation policies,
passing the decit onto the ACs, has made them worse.
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