The need* for a nexus between security and development both in policy terms and programmatic terms is now a given. Heated debate in the 90’s about the relationship between security and development have set up a more widely view that there can’t be security without development and development without security. The UN Report ‘In Larger Freedom’ (2005) clearly endorsed this view, as other key policy documents did, including the European Security Strategy (2005) and the OECD DAC Guidelines on Helping to Prevent Violence Conflict. As it wasPage 41outlined in Helping to Prevent Violence Conflict “poverty and insecurity systematically reinforce each other and therefore, the response needs to address both simultaneously.”1 The international community have learned hard but valuable lessons from their recent efforts to prevent conflict and build peace in contexts as diverse as Timor Leste, Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Kosovo. It is increasingly clear that if States are to collaborate in creating the conditions to escape from a downward spiral wherein insecurity, criminalisation and under-development, they are mutually reinforcing, socio-economic and security dimensions must be tackled simultaneously. In this bilateral and multilateral context, governmental and non-governmental actors are beginning to see the challenge of insecurity as a barrier to political, economical and social development.
While the need for coherence between security and development is evident at the normative level, ‘the devil is in the detail,’ insofar as the foundational and technical complexities only really come to the fore when security and development is operationalised. The diverse challenges that have to be tackled in post-conflict contexts - rebuilding or, in many cases, creating basic service provision -requires a diverse set of skills. The capacity required to rebuild health, education, security and justice services can rarely be found in one government agency or actor, and herein lies the challenge of coherence, coordination and harmonisation of international actions. As the sub-title of this chapter suggests, the different government departments bring with them perceived and real cultural differences. Each government actor has a different mandate, and brings different skills, approaches and capacity to the task. This chapter will explore the challenges (both interpretational and practical) inherent in ensuring a coherent approach to stabilisation and peacebuilding activities and will present a number of concrete recommendations that can enhance the impact of international support in these contexts. The question is posed whether the international community has the systems and capacity in place to be able to secure the peace and work effectively across the security-development nexus to ensure long-term and sustainable stability.
One of the challenges facing the practical development of the security-development nexus is the fact that the notion of security differs from one contextPage 42to another and from one policy community to another. Some military and defence communities operating in conflict zones see security solely in terms of eliminating conflict and securing territory, often referred to as the ‘clear, hold and build’ strategy. The peacebuilding community operating in similar environments tend to focus more of the root causes of insecurity and the reform measures that need to be put in place to delivery security – notably through security sector reform operations. The core development community and poverty reduction practitioners are more likely to put the accent on human security – alongside the resource issues that trigger insecurity.
The understanding and values that different policy communities bring to the table in relation to the concept of security, makes the articulation of a coherent security and development policy difficult to develop and manage.
The traditional development community and development agencies have been slow converts in seeing the need to synergise security and development. There are a number of reasons for this, including a core belief that the focus should be on the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. Secondly, development agencies and the development community have in the past tended to associate security more often than not with hard security, rather than with the type of crime, conflict and violence prevention activities that are in critical need in conflict and post conflict settings. Thirdly, development cooperation prioritises respect for local ownership and an apolitical approach when possible. There is a fear that linkage to the security dimension may damage relations between donors and local actors and may also overly politicise aid. Finally, the development cooperation community has sometimes felt that overzealous cooperation with the security community may negatively impinge on a development agency’s mandate or budget, resulting in the ‘securitisation of development’.
The move towards linking security and development followed on seamlessly in the post Cold War period from the rise of the democratisation agenda, that included elements related to a greater emphasis on human rights, the idea that state security should be based on human security and the part benign/part hubris call for greater international involvement in peacebuilding. Since then international donor intervention in conflict and post conflict settings has increased and responded to the ‘new’, ‘post-modern’ or ‘network’ wars that havePage 43challenged political authority, governance, and the entire social fabric of conflict-torn states more directly than did earlier wars. Over the last fifteen years the donor response has become much more focused on intervening to support a viable and legitimate political authority, alongside core governance functions. Views vary considerably on this interventionist paradigm. What is clear is that donor...