Lecciones históricas sobre el apoyo de la inteligencia para contrarrestar fuerzas clandestinas en insurgencias
| Autor | Jason A. Spitaletta; Summer D. Newton; Nathan D. Bos; Charles W. Cros Ett; And Robert R. Leonhard |
| Páginas | 102-128 |
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The following article draws from research performed to develop a summaiy account of 23 insurgencies and revolutions from 1962-20091 (including a more in-depth treatment of 6 of those cases) as well as sepárate research efforts to update the 1963 Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary, and Resístame Warfare and the 1966 Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies.2 The ongoing project, entitled Assessing Revolutionary and Insurgent Strategies (ARIS), is funded by the United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) with the research, analysis, and publication performed by the National Security Analysis Department of the Johns Hopkins Univer-sity Applied Physics Laboratory QHU/APL).
The ARIS dataset was selected from a list of the hundreds of insurgences that were ongoing or initiated after 1962. For ARIS, a revolution was defined as an attempt to modify the existing political system at least partially through unconstitutional or illegal use of forcé or protest. This definition describes the desired end-state (a modification of the existing political system), as well as the means by which an organization seeks to achieve that goal (unconstitutional or illegal use of forcé or protest). Therefore, a revolution does not necessarily en-compass the usurpation of power by the insurgents but can be a modification of the existing system according to the group's demands. The revolution must also include some unconstitutional or illegal actions to achieve that end-state.
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Revolutions are illustrative manifestations of contentious politics,3 the em-ployment of a set of disruptive techniques such as general strikes, civil disobe-dience, riots, and even terrorism, to achieve political objectives (Adams, Tar-row and Tilly, 2001: 5). This particular variant of socio-political movements has unique psychological, sociological, and political requirements and mecha-nisms which make them a compelling área of study. The below table includes the individual case studies included in the dataset along with the correspond-ing category in which it was placed.
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Each case study was presented in a standardized format to allow the reader to compare particular aspects or factors across cases, as well as to en-sure that the research conducted was sufficiently comprehensive. Within this analytic framework was a section entitled "Form and Characteristics of the Revolution" which included both how the organization used intelligence as well as which countermeasures were employed against the movement.
One of the key functions of irregular warfare, irrespective of one's political alignment, is intelligence. Insurgent and counterinsurgent leaders must have relevant and timely information in order to make decisions and guide their or-ganizations. Insurgent and revolutionary movements subsist on good intelligence: its colleaion, analysis, and dissemination is one of the critical capabili-ties of the underground, and without it such movements inevitably fail. Henee, underground operations include provisions for the systematized colleaion of intelligence on adversary disposition, political developments, target acquisition, population dynamics, and criminal and law enforcement activities. While the colleaion of intelligence thus remains a vital requirement for the organization, it is also one of the typically inherent strengths of undergrounds. An effective insurgency or revolutionary movement develops cióse ties with the population—rural, urban, or both. The closer and stronger those conneaions are, the better the flow of relevant, timely, and aecurate intelligence.
Many factors frame and influence the intelligence process. Language, cultural affinity, and methods of Communications can either facilítate or in-hibit intelligence efforts. Government countermeasures, particularly when informed by enlightened counterinsurgeney strategy and reinforced with effective governance that aims at solving core issues, can disrupt and neu-tralize an insurgency's intelligence efforts. These countermeasures include a spectrum of activities that ranges from simple operational security practices to the detection, identification, and elimination of enemy agents. The intelligence process is so closely linked with an insurgency's success or failure that it becomes a key focus of successful counterinsurgeney. When an insurgent group is denied effective intelligence it cannot opérate effectively, and its vulnerability to countermeasures increases. Absent relevant information on government activities, forces, dispositions, and weaknesses, such groups must either hazard ill-advised attacks or lapse into inactivity, threatening the movement's growth and relevance. Henee, effective counterinsurgeney must include strong measures to disrupt enemy intelligence.
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This arricie addresses neither the totality of underground functions ñor the comprehensive set of countermeasures that have been employed against them; rather it will focus on arguably the most important function in wag-ing or countering irregular warfare: intelligence. It will begin with an intro-duction to some of the emerging trends identified in the structure and functions of insurgencies, will continué with a discussion of the conduct of underground intelligence, and will conclude with some identified trends in intelligence countermeasures employed by counterinsurgent forces.
As defined in the 1963 work, undergrounds are "the clandestine elements of indigenous politico-military revolutionary organizations which attempt to illegally weaken, modify, or replace the government authority, typically through the use or threat of forcé" (Molnar, Lynrand, Hahn, Kirkman and Riddleberger, 1963). Since the original research in the 1960s, the globaliza-tion of media (including the advent of the internet), the demise of Soviet communism and the Cold War, and the rise of Islamic fundamentalism have all impacted on the functionality of undergrounds. The original study's main thesis — that the underground component of an insurgency is the sine qua non of all such movements — is demonstrably accurate today. As the art and practice of insurgency has evolved almost every aspect of this definition can be called into question. As the bipolarity of the Cold War gave way to military uni-polarity and economic multi-polarity; the political and finan-cial options for aggrieved groups were restricted. No longer could groups seeking reform or resolution of political economic or social inequity turn to the Communist International (Comintern) or other state or supranational entity for financing and/or international recognition and political legiti-macy. This evolving geopolitical landscape is likely to have contributed to seemingly counterintuitive trends in insurgent warfare. The first is the emergence of an organic public component of an insurgent group (ex-plained below) and the second is an increased reliance on criminal activities to fund underground operations.
During the Cold War, undergrounds functioned outside the legal sphere while nation-states' actions were recognized as "legal" and "legitímate." To-
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day, those distinctions have blurred; many insurgencies opérate simultane-ously in the legal, illegal, and quasi-legal domains, and governments some-times engage in illegal activity to oppose them. This phenomenon is not unique to the developing world as certain tactics employed by the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)'s counterintelligence program (COIN-TELPRO) employed against the Black Panther Party for Self-Defense4 were ruled illegal (Van DeBurg, 1992).
Likewise, it is difficult to identify an explicit boundary between covert and overt operations, since modern insurgencies simultaneously conduct both. A plausible explanation for this difficulty is the paradigm shift in how insurgencies succeed or fail. The classic method of examination conceptualizes an in-surgency gaining strength and momentum over a long campaign and finally seizing control of the government through forcé of arms (e.g., the traditional Maoist model evidenced by the Communist takeover of China). Modern insurgencies, particularly those considered successful, are more likely to gain so me level of legitimate, open political acknowledgement while simultaneously continuing in quasi-legal and illegal activity. Hizbullah, arguably one of the most successful insurgent movements in history, has achieved legal and quasi-legal status as a political forcé within its home country. It survived and evolved through the 1980s to become a viable political party, a "state-within-a-state" in Lebanon, providing many of the resources to its "citizens" traditionally sup-plied by a sovereign state. In addition, of course, Hizbullah is a potent armed forcé against both Israel and its political opponents as well as a criminal or-ganization with global reach (Leonhard, In Press).
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The prototypical modern insurgency includes four major spheres: the underground, the auxiliary, the guerilla component,6 and the public organization [Figure 1]. At the start of an insurgency, the underground might be the only active sphere. As the organization evolves, guerilla contingents be-
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gin to multiply and opérate. Eventually, pursuant to a political agreement, the insurgency begins to opérate in the public political process. If successful there, the movement itself might at some point become public — e.g., when they become the solé legitímate government or form part of the existing government. Thus, the four spheres — guerrilla, underground, auxiliary, and public — exist in a dynamic and evolving relationship. The public component is different from the underground in that it is not clandestine and...
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