China and the Fifth Estate: Net Delusion or Democratic Potential?
| Autor | William H. Dutton - Sun Huan - Weiwei Shen |
| Cargo | Professor of Media and Information Policy, College of Communication Arts and Sciences (Michigan State University) - Research associate with ESO Fund - SJD student, University of Pennsylvania Law School |
| Páginas | 6-24 |
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* This article extends and updates an earlier working paper presented at ‘New Media, Internet Communication, and
Communities in China’, a Preconference for the Annual Meeting of the International Communication Association (ICA)
in Phoenix, Arizona, 23 May 2012 (Huan et al., 2013).
** The authors are listed alphabetically to denote their comparable contributions. The original concept for the work
came from the lead author. Sun Huan conducted the original field research and early drafts of the case studies. Weiwei
Shen provided fresh and independent reviews of the case material and contributed to the drafting of the paper.
Submission date: February 2015
Accepted date: May 2015
Published in: June 2015
ARTicle
China and the Fifth Estate:
Net Delusion or Democratic
Potential?*
William H. Dutton**
Professor of Media and Information Policy
College of Communication Arts and Sciences (Michigan State University)
Sun Huan
Huan Sun
Research associate with ESO Fund
Weiwei Shen
SJD student
University of Pennsylvania Law School
Monograph “The impact of social media in politics and public administrations”
Abstract
Arguably, liberal democratic societies are seeing the emergence of a ‘Fifth Estate’ that is being enabled
by the Internet. This new organizational form is comparable to, but potentially more powerful than, the
Fourth Estate, which developed as a significant force in an earlier period with an independent press
and other mass media. While the significance of the press and the Internet to democratic governance
is questioned in all societies, there is particular skepticism of their relevance outside the most liberal
democratic regimes, which have a relatively free press and more pluralistic political systems, such as
William H. Dutton, Sun Huan, Weiwei Shen
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in North America and West Europe. Nevertheless, there have been vivid examples of where networked
individuals have appeared to assert greater communicative power in the politics of governance, the media
and everyday life, even in non-liberal democratic regimes, such as Hong Kong, and in some cases, China.
This potential points to the need for more systematic empirical research in a wider variety of economic
and political settings worldwide, particularly in states in which the Internet might offer a potential for
more democratic governance and greater accountability of government controlled media. This paper
examines cases in which networked individuals in China used the Internet to hold governmental and
press institutions more accountable. The cases provide support for the relevance of the Fifth Estate
concept in China, and also illuminates the process – showing how the Internet can be used to empower
networked individuals in more autocratic regimes.
Keywords
fifth estate, 5th estate, China, empowerment, communication, power, democracy
Topic
Internet and politics
China y el quinto poder:
¿ilusión de la red o potencial democrático?
Resumen
Podría decirse que las sociedades democráticas están asistiendo a la emergencia de un «quinto poder»,
que es posible gracias a internet. Esta nueva forma de organización es comparable al cuarto poder –pero
potencialmente es más poderosa–, que se desarrolló como una fuerza significativa en una época anterior
gracias a una prensa independiente y otros medios de comunicación de masa. Aunque la importancia de
la prensa y de internet para la gobernanza democrática es cuestionada en todas las sociedades, existe un
particular escepticismo en cuanto a su importancia entre regímenes democráticos más liberales, en los
que la prensa es relativamente libre y los sistemas políticos son más plurales, por ejemplo Norteamérica y
Europa occidental. Sin embargo, ha habido destacables ejemplos de lugares donde individuos conectados
en red han tenido un gran poder comunicativo sobre las políticas de gobierno, los medios de comunicación
y la vida cotidiana, incluso en regímenes democráticos no liberales, como es Hong Kong y, en ciertos
casos, China. Este potencial señala la necesidad de una investigación empírica más sistemática en una
variedad más amplia de escenarios económicos y políticos del mundo, especialmente en estados donde
internet ofrezca posibilidades para una gobernanza más democrática y para una mayor responsabilidad y
transparencia de los medios de comunicación controlados por los gobiernos. Este trabajo estudia casos en
que individuos conectados en red en China utilizaron internet para que instituciones gubernamentales y
de prensa tuvieran más responsabilidad a la hora de rendir cuentas. Estos casos reafirman la importancia
del concepto de quinto poder en China, además de alumbrar el proceso, mostrando cómo internet se
puede utilizar para capacitar a los individuos conectados en red en regímenes más autocráticos.
Palabras clave
quinto poder, 5º poder, China, empoderamiento, comunicación, poder, democracia
Tema
internet y política
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1. See: chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/7206-Can-air-pollution-app-for-smartphone-users-kickstart-new-era-of-
transparency-in-China-> [Accessed: 20 May 2015].
2. See: reporting-opinion/environment/can-pollution-tracking-app-kickstart-transparency> [Accessed: 20 May 2015].
Introduction
In 2015, China’s Premier, Li Keqiang, spoke at a news
conference following the National People’s Congress, to
say that the government would address public concerns
over pollution. This was a response attributed in part to a
popular documentary, entitled “Under the Dome”. The film
was produced by a state television producer, but popularized
rapidly over social media. It pulled together increasing
evidence that contradicted the government’s own claims
regarding safe levels of pollution in the major cities. The
Internet and social media complemented the documentary
in this case by enabling it to spread widely and very rapidly
–while the conference was in progress, and before it was
banned from Websites. Prior to this moment, the Internet
also was used to providing evidence of pollution levels that
was relatively independent of governmental control. Large
numbers of residents in major cities used mobile phone
environmental apps as sensors to register levels of pollution.
1
Readings from these apps could then be aggregated to
provide real-time reports on pollution levels based on
this collective intelligence, which often contradicted more
positive reports by governmental authorities. This led to
more accountable agencies being established to monitor
pollution levels in a more transparent and comparative
manner, such as by ranking cities.
2
The Question
Are such instances evidence of the potential for the Internet
to enable more democratic forms of accountability, or an
illusion of democracy? The potential of the Internet as a
tool for democratic empowerment has been widely debated
and researched, particularly in the aftermath of the series
of protests and demonstrations across the Middle East that
has been called the Arab Spring. Critics of the Internet
supporting this democratic potential have argued that
this technology can be used more effectively by autocratic
regimes to reinforce their power, such as through even
more powerful tools for state surveillance than is possible
by networked citizens, or “netizens” (e.g., Morozov, 2011).
This is in line with the long-term view that information and
communication technologies (ICTs) are sufficiently malleable
that their adoption and implementation will tend to reinforce
existing structures of power and influence rather than open
up the potential for shifting power to new actors (Danziger
et al., 1982).
However, there is evidence in a growing number of cases
where networked individuals have been able to use the
Internet to challenge powerful institutions, such as by
having greater access to information and also the ability
to expose information in ways that can hold the powerful
more accountable, such as in the case of Wikileaks. This
potential has led to the concept of a new “Fifth Estate” role
that the Internet can enable (Dutton, 1999, 2010, 2013, 2015).
The Idea of a Fifth Estate
This perspective on the Internet’s political implications for
the politics of governance, the media and everyday life
is that networked individuals are able to use the Internet
and related information and communication technologies
to perform a “Fifth Estate” function that is analogous to
the role of the press in an earlier era. A distinctive aspect
of this perspective is that it is not anchored in conceptions
of institutional change. That is, unlike conceptions of
cyber- or e-democracy, the Fifth Estate does not depend
on governmental institutions using the Internet to
transform themselves into more democratic institutions,
such as by using more direct forms of democratic control,
like referendums or electronic voting and polling. Instead,
networked individuals can create and obtain information
resources through the Internet, that are outside of and more
independent of existing institutions, thereby creating a more
pluralistic basis of accountability, literally enabling them to
speak the truth to power.
However, most studies of the Internet and democracy
are anchored in liberal democratic political systems with
a relatively free press, independent judiciaries and some
separation of powers. The same is true for studies of the
Fifth Estate. While a growing number of studies have
focused on the role of the Internet in the politics of the
media in China, such as focusing on such issues as the
impact of blogging on the press, they have not focused
on holding other institutions, such as the government,
more accountable (Zheng, 2007; Yang, 2009; Shirk, 2011;
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Hassid, 2012). Few studies in China have focused on more
conventional initiatives around democratic reform, given
they are so rare, and none have viewed activities from the
perspective of the Fifth Estate. In fact, to many scholars of
politics in China, the lack of a liberal democratic tradition
and institutions in China is likely to negate the potential for
the emergence of a Fifth Estate role of the Internet.
Approach of this Study
This article seeks to challenge the view that a Fifth Estate
could not emerge in China, seen as a non-liberal democratic
state that has taken an aggressive role in controlling the
media and Internet use. Case studies in China are used to
elaborate this potential, such as the role of searching and
networking by networked individuals, for which blogging
is one of many tools, and also to advance understanding
of its dynamics in a nation where the emergence of a
Fifth Estate would not have been anticipated, given strict
state controls of the media. This study suggests that the
concept of the Fifth Estate is indeed relevant to China,
and also illuminates the processes that enabled networked
individuals to use the Internet in ways that enhanced their
communicative power.
China is becoming a key focus of Internet studies because
of governmental efforts to control Internet content, but also
because it has become the nation with the largest number of
users, exceeding 642 million by 2015.
3
Three cases in China
were chosen because each was widely reputed to have been
reshaped by the public’s use of the Internet. These cases not
only support the utility of the concept of a Fifth Estate in the
context of China, but also further an understanding of the
dynamics that enable the Fifth Estate to empower networked
individuals. In all three cases, Internet users became involved
when traditional mechanisms of consultation, state media,
and news reporting did not meet the expectations of a set
of networked individuals. Networked individuals played
a Fifth Estate role in each case by holding the press or
governmental institutions more accountable, primarily by
sourcing their own information and reframing issues in ways
that engaged more actors. They were able to change the
scope of conflict in ways that reflected a key aspect of E.
E. Schattschneider’s (1960) conception of the dynamics of
political conflict – an extreme case of his conception of the
“semi-sovereign people”.
The following section briefly sketches the idea of a Fifth Estate
and the patterns of findings that led to its formulation. This
is followed by an overview of the methodological approach
of this study before describing the three case studies. The
final sections reflect back on these case studies to elaborate
the application of the Fifth Estate in the context of China,
and its relationship to how Schattschneider’s notions can
be brought into the digital age in a nondemocratic context.
Of course, it is impossible to generalize beyond these cases
to the larger context of China, particularly given that they
are atypical or extreme cases. Nevertheless, as critical
cases, they provide an empirical approach to developing a
better understanding of the Fifth Estate and how networked
individuals can indeed be empowered even in states without
a relatively independent press or open Internet. These cases
and our interpretations can advance theory as they are
critically assessed and elaborated by further cases and related
empirical research in China and other networked nations.
The Fifth Estate Perspective
There are competing conceptions of the role the Internet
can play in (dis)empowering citizens, ranging from the
Internet being irrelevant clicktivism (Bennett et al., 1999),
inherently democratic or anti-democratic (de Sola Pool
1983), or socially shaped to reinforce existing structures
of control (Danziger et al., 1982; Morozov, 2011). A variation
of this reinforcement position is a new perspective on the
politics of the Internet, which has been conceptualized as
enabling a Fifth Estate.
From this Fifth Estate perspective, the communicative
power of networked individuals is being reinforced by the
ways they can use the Internet to source information and
form networks in ways that can hold other actors more
accountable, in ways that are comparable in significance
to the rise of the Fourth Estate in an earlier era. They are
not transforming existing democratic institutions, such as
public consultation, but adding a new and more independent
source for creating, networking, and providing information
resources that can challenge existing institutions.
Early research on the power shifts associated with the
adoption and use of computing in organizations, found
3. See World Internet Stats at: .internetworldstats.com/stats3.htm#asia> [Accessed: 21 May 2015].
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computers were used in ways that tended to follow and
reinforce existing structures of power and influence
(Danziger et al., 1982). This perspective remains prominent,
such as in the influential work of Evgeny Morozov (2011),
and Jan Van Dijk (2012). Morozov, for example, argued that
the political context of Internet use drives its implications.
From his perspective, in many nations the Internet will
be controlled by autocrats in ways that will follow and
reinforce their influence, rather than being used as a tool
for democratic empowerment – which he characterized
as a “net delusion” (Morozov, 2011). While his work was
published before the Arab uprisings, it remains an influential
perspective, and has been lent some support by the longer-
term reversals of the democratic uprisings supported by
networked individuals. The ability of networked individuals
to sustain activity overtime is a serious issue limiting the
capacity of a Fifth Estate (Dutton and Lin, 2001).
However, one major problem with this reinforcement
perspective is that the Internet is a huge, complex, and
global technical system that is increasingly impossible for
any single actor to control (Dutton et al., 2012). This makes
reinforcement politics more problematic. A more inductive
perspective on the role of the Internet has focused on
observing actual patterns of use and impact to determine
what kinds of power shifts emerge in practice. This inductive
approach led to early conceptions of reinforcement politics
in organizations, such as local governments (Danziger et al.,
1982). However, the development and use of the Internet
over the ensuing decades raise questions over the degree
that autocrats, organizations or nations can continue to
exercise control over the development and impact of globally
networked ICTs like the Internet and related social media.
Like the social shaping perspective on ICTs, the concept of
a Fifth Estate is not technologically deterministic. It focuses
on the technical, social and political contexts of use, but it
also does not presume that existing structures of power and
influence are simply reinforced, given the global ecology
of actors that are shaping the Internet and its implications
in a variety of intended and unanticipated ways. From an
empirical, inductive perspective, research has documented
a developing pattern of findings that support the role of the
Internet in empowering networked individuals in ways that
they can counter existing institutions, such as governments
and the press (Dutton 2007, 2009, 2010; Newman et al., 2012).
In particular, users of the Internet have increasingly brought
the Internet into their work and everyday life in more central
ways that provide them with more independence from any
single institution, such as a local government or the media.
They go to the Internet as a first port of call for information,
rather than going to a particular place– to a global space
of flows rather than a local space of places (Castells, 2004,
pp. 11-12). Moreover, they do not go to specific sites, but
most often find content through search engines or social
networks, which refer them to information of most relevance
to their interests. While new algorithms and search histories
might limit the openness of search, this management of
search is one element of a strategy for limiting or enlarging
the role of the Internet in supporting networked individuals.
In addition, networked individuals have a learned level of
trust in the information they source, which is comparable
to, if not greater than what they learn from the press or
broadcasting (Blank and Dutton, 2011). In China, for example,
reliance on the Internet for information is in many respects
more prominent than in the US and other liberal democracies
in which people can have greater trust in the mass media
(Dutton et al., 2013).
The concept of the Fifth Estate envisions the Internet
as a platform through which networked individuals can
perform a useful democratic role in holding institutions
such as the media and government more accountable.
Networked individuals can source their own information,
independent of any single institution, using the capabilities
provided by search and social media. Also, users can
create their own content in many forms, from monitoring
pollution levels with an environmental app to posting
photos on blogs, to commenting on websites, providing
even greater independence from other institutions and
offering a mechanism whereby public opinion can be directly
expressed.
This individually sourced or distributed content can bypass
or be amplified by the traditional mass media of the Fourth
Estate, such as in the case of ‘Under the Dome’, but in doing
so it can fulfil many of the same functions of holding the
activities of government, business and other institutions up
to the light of a networked public. In such ways, the Fifth
Estate is distinct from the mainstream of media studies
that focus on the relationships between mass media and
blogging, such as in setting agendas (Hassid, 2012). From a
Fifth Estate perspective, the Internet is not viewed simply as
a new medium, but as a platform that can be used by media
institutions but also by networked individuals to challenge
the media and play a potentially important political role, yet
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without the institutional foundations of the Fourth Estate.
It is composed of the distributed activities of one or many
individuals acting on their own or collaboratively but in
a more decentralized network. This means that it is not
equivalent to a social movement. Revolving sets of networked
individuals can hold the leadership of social movements
accountable like other institutional authorities in ways
enabled by the Internet (Dutton, 2009; Newman et al., 2011).
The Dynamics of the Fifth Estate:
An Old Perspective on a New Phenomenon
This Fifth Estate perspective guided our approach to the
case studies noted above. Its dynamics will be developed
further in this article in light of the cases. However, in the
course of our early efforts to understand the dynamics
of the Fifth Estate in the context of our cases, we were
reminded of E. E. Schattschneider’s (1960) perspective on
the dynamics of political conflicts. His ideas are based on
traditional political strategies in liberal democratic politics
– not on the politics of the Internet in authoritarian regimes.
Therefore, his notions around the ‘semi-sovereign people’
are most often reflected in mass media research around
the role of agenda-setting and issue-framing (McLeod and
Detenber, 1999). And work on agenda setting has proven
to be of value in the context of China, with its active
blogging communities (Shirk 2011; Hassid 2012). However,
Schattschneider’s original conception linked agenda setting
and framing, as conceptualized in contemporary research,
more directly to the outcome of political conflict. It therefore
provided a useful language for discussing the role of the
Fifth Estate, as will be described in the case studies.
Essentially, Schattschneider (1960, p. 1) argued that the
central aspect of politics in a liberal democratic society is
that conflict can spread or exhibit ‘contagiousness’. The
importance of this is captured by his analogy between
politics and spectator sports, except – he points out – in
the game of politics, the spectators can join in the game
at any time and on any side. And the outcome of the game
or political conflict is shaped by the extent to which the
spectators become involved and on what side they choose
to join in. This dynamic makes the most important strategy
of politics is for contestants to control the scope of a conflict.
This is one reason why traditional political institutions place
much effort in controlling communication. They do not want
to accidentally create issues that bring more people into a
conflict as it could have unpredictable consequences on
the outcome.
For example, if someone is winning a contest, they would
want to retain the present scope of conflict, and keep all
the spectators in the stands. In contrast, it is in the interest
of those losing a conflict to broaden the scope, since they
have nothing more to lose and can open up the possibility of
more spectators joining their side in the conflict and thereby
create the potential for a more positive outcome. The scope
of the conflict can be changed by socializing or drawing the
attention of more people to the conflict (agenda-setting),
or changing the issue (re-framing), which can lead some
spectators to join a particular side or for some contestants
to switch sides. This simple analogy provides a powerful
perspective on why the Internet can play a pivotal role in the
political process. But for networked individuals to use the
Internet to shape the scope of conflict, they need alternative
channels of communication, such as a blog, that are not
controlled by those winning the game. It also requires the
ability to source credible information that is independent
of the media and other institutions that are shaping the
agenda. As you follow the cases described below, you can
see the ways in which networked individuals played this role
in reconfiguring the scope of conflict.
Mini-Cases of an Emerging
Fifth Estate Role
Given countervailing expectations on the role of the Internet,
along with a prevailing theme of state control being likely
to marginalize the significance of the Internet in politics,
we were captivated by stories of the Internet being used
effectively within states, such as China, which is among the
nations which have the highest levels of regulation of online
expression (Deibert et al., 2010). For example, in July of 2011,
when 40 people were killed in a high-speed train collision in
Wenzhou, in the Zhejiang province of China, governmental
efforts to constrain media coverage of this accident soon led
to critical coverage online and in the press (Areddy and Yang,
2011). The Internet is not expected to enable the formation
of an independent base of political and social accountability,
in states that do not have an independent press (Bennett,
2010) but also control Internet use, such as through Internet
content filtering and the control of users, e.g., through the
arrest of bloggers. Nevertheless, events such as those that
followed the Wenzhou speed train incident suggest that
scholars cannot dismiss the Internet and the media’s role in
states like China, which merit further exploration. Moreover,
key studies of the Internet in China reinforce the potential
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for networked individuals to be empowered in this context
(Yang, 2009; Shirk, 2011).
The Context: Content Regulation in China
China has become a primary example of a state with
a controlled press, where a number of government
organizations have combined to regulate media content,
despite demands for better news coverage (Shirk, 2010). At
the highest level, the Communist Party’s Central Propaganda
Department (CPD) is responsible for oversight of the media.
In practice, the CPD works in collaboration with other
government bodies, such as the General Administration of
Press and Publication (GAPP) and the State Administration
of Radio, Film, and Television (SARFT). Together, they
produce guidelines to instruct the work of media outlets
across the country. For example, news reporting about
politically sensitive events is strictly forbidden (Bennett,
2010). However, these guidelines are not sufficiently public
or explicit to eliminate ambiguity over what for example,
might be viewed as politically sensitive. Experienced media
practitioners are expected to know where to draw the line,
but such self-regulation often leads news organizations to err
on the side of over-regulation and censure of questionable
news reporting (Stern and O’Brien, 2011).
These regulatory guidelines have been applied to the
news services on the Web, social media, mobile phones,
and related ICTs. However, more government organizations
are involved in monitoring and censorship of the online
world (Zhao, 2009). Beyond CPD, GAPP, and SARFT, these
include: the State Council Information Office (SCIO), which
has the power of licensing agencies in putting original
news online, and also oversees websites that feed from
these approved news agencies; the Ministry of Information
Industry (MII), which is responsible for the supervision of
the telecommunication infrastructure such as international
gateway systems and text message jamming (Zhao, 2009);
the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), the State Secrecy
Bureau and China’s Judiciary, which can monitor websites,
and track and investigate users that threaten online security
(Anon, 2009); and the Ministry of Culture (MC), which
plays a key role in making policies and enforcing laws and
regulations to direct the mainstream culture in line with the
priorities of the CPD. These organizations are integrated in
ways that are designed to implement the guidance provided
by the Communist Party. However, given the number of
agencies involved, and the existence of still other regulatory
regimes, such as those regulating mobile phone services,
many of which might have competing views on the same
issues, there remains a level of uncertainty over content
regulation, particularly at the local level. Nevertheless, as
described here, China has a strong regulatory regime aimed
towards controlling the press and mass media, including
the Internet and related social media, making exceptions
to state control notable.
Selection of Mini-Cases
Three case studies were selected because of their notoriety
as examples in which the Internet seemed to play a significant
role in government and politics. The cases included an
effort to block the Xiamen Paraxylene (PX) petrochemical
project; challenges to the failures in reporting of a gas
explosion in Nanjing; and uncovering an expense claims
scandal by judicial officials. They are not purported to be
a representative sample or in-depth participant observer
case studies. To the contrary, they are exceptional or critical
cases, in three different areas of policy, and examined in
a focused way to determine whether there was sufficient
evidence of a Fifth Estate role. Each seemed significant
as well by virtue of involving the allocation of resources
with redistributive consequences. Buildings were not built,
individuals were fired, public officials were disciplined.
Tangible resources were at stake in non-trivial ways.
Sources of Evidence and Empirical Methods
of Observation
Because the cases we studied appeared to counter
conventional expectations, our research initially sought to
critically question whether these accounts were credible
or simply new urban myths. In each case we found them
substantiated by multiple sources of evidence, ranging from
multiple journalistic accounts to interviews with participants
and observers, as described and referenced below. As
importantly, we sought to understand how the Internet was
able to effect change, despite state oversight and control
of online expression in China.
The cases were explored in stages. We first systematically
surveyed press and blog coverage at several levels. We
began with searches for articles related to each of the three
cases in the Chinese database of newspapers archived by
the China National Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI). This
coverage enabled us to identify the course of events for each
case as well as points of contention. Using and extrapolating
from the key words within these reports, we then searched
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the major Chinese blog, BBS, and microblog platforms, such
as SinaWeibo, Sina Blog, Sohu Blog, Net Ease and Tianya
BBS, for additional material related to each case. We found
the posts often referring to local online forums or other
pieces of information about these cases such as video posts
on Youku, so they were included in our dataset and analysis.4
This background information provided the basic narrative of
each case. The lead Chinese author then e-mailed selected
participants, such as bloggers and reporters involved in each
of the events in order to request additional details, validate
reports, and generate links to other participants. This
approach led to direct communication with key participants,
interviewed primarily over the Internet or by phone. Key
sources of major factual claims and observations relevant
to each case are cited in the text and associated notes, with
the permission of those interviewed. We have only included
the names of reporters and bloggers who have given their
permission, and who are well known by their role in the
cases. Otherwise, we do not report the actual names of
bloggers or individuals interviewed.
The next sections describe each mini-case. We call them
“mini-cases” since we were not able to conduct the level
of detailed participant-observation that we would have in
a full case study, limited by the sensitivity of the cases and
topics. After describing the cases, we offer a number of
general observations on some of their cross-cutting themes.
Cases of a Fifth Estate in China
Blocking an Environmentally Hazardous Plant:
the Xiamen PX Project
In 2007, the residents of Xiamen, a port city in Fujian Province
in south-eastern China, halted the proposed construction of
a local chemical plant, intended for production of paraxylene
(PX), a petrochemical used in manufacturing polyester and
other fabrics. The construction site was seven kilometres
from the city centre and less than 1.5 kilometres from a
residential area with two universities and thousands of
residents (Xie, 2007). Similar projects had been built further
from city centres, often by seventy or more kilometres.
Residents opposed the PX project as a threat to their
seaside environment, and used the Internet in multiple
ways to express their opposition, including online activism
- clicktivism, text message campaigns, and the orchestration
of peaceful demonstrations.
The project had obtained approvals from the central
government and the State Environmental Protection
Administration (SEPA) in 2004 and 2005, respectively.
Moreover, the National Development and Reform
Commission identified it as one of seven crucial PX projects
of the nation’s Eleventh Five-year Plan. Therefore, despite
concerns expressed by local residents, one of the most
important industrial projects in Xiamen’s history was
launched on 17 November 2006. An official report of the
company said that this project was symbolic of Xiamen rising
to the status of a world-class petrochemical giant.
5
After the project’s approval was announced, environmental
experts, including noted academics, repeated concerns over
its impact and called for the project to be stopped. During
two subsequent congresses, the National People’s Congress
(NPC), and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative
Conference (CPPCC) in 2007, 105 members jointly signed
the ‘Proposal of Moving the Xiamen Haicang PX Project’.
One of them, Zhao Yufen, a member of the Chinese Academy
of Sciences (CAS) and a professor of Xiamen University,
stated in a published interview that: “PX is a dangerous,
highly carcinogenic chemical that can cause a high rate of
fetal deformities” (Qu, 2007).
Also, local media in Xiamen featured regular reports on
the project, focusing on the environmental issues. These
were augmented by bloggers. One famous online activist,
Zhong Xiaoyong, in his persona as the blogger Lian Yue,
posted a series of blogs on this project– with titles such
as “Environmental protection officials who can not protect
the environment”, and “What are the people of Xiamen
supposed to do!”. He suggested simple actions that individual
citizens could take in order to oppose the proposed siting
of the plant, sent many messages about the health risks,
4. Most of the sources were surveyed during the period from August to December 2010, but followed up after the initial studies and a repeated
series of revisions of each case, which added materials to the cases. The complete collection of the anonymized sources can be made
available upon request.
5. Reporting to the Secretary General, available at: www.xm.gov.cn/xmyw/200701/t20070114_151080.htm> [Accessed: 22 December,
2010].
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and reassured the public that they would be safe from
retribution. He blogged: “Don’t be afraid’ and that there is
‘no need to commit any acts of bravery” (Kennedy, 2010).
On 15 March 2007, a blog called “Haicang, My Home” was
set up by Xiamen residents, on which they posted dramatic
pleas, such as “The cries of residents of Xiamen City, Fujian
province — please save our rights to live!”. The blog stated:
[…] every time we call the police or the environmental
protection hotline, the answer we are given is that someone will
be coming right away to see if the plant is operating properly
or not. […] Yet the residents have not received any data on
the pollution, nor monitoring of the air quality index, since
the district was established three years ago. Xiamen has air
quality forecasts done every day, yet the only area overlooked
is Haicang District. We just want fresh air! Smells that are strong
enough to wake people up in the middle of the night do no harm
to the body? Even when the Fujian provincial environmental
protection agency teamed up with the Xiamen city government
environmental protection agency in September to carry out
a three-day monitoring of air quality in Haicang, the result
was that hydrogen sulphide levels and the strength of stench
exceeded national standards (report available at the city and
district environmental protection agencies).
6
On 28 May 2007, Wang Yongjun, who had been a journalist
for the Xiamen Bureau of the Xinhua News Agency, posted
an article online to persuade residents to send out an anti-
pollution SMS (Short Message Service) at Oeeee.com,
7
using a ID of Xiamen Wave.
8
The pronunciation of this ID
in the Fujian native dialect is exactly the same as for a
Xiamen resident, making it readily memorable. When it was
published in the Southern Metropolitan Daily, the article
received attention from other national media and national
portal sites, which immediately reported the article on their
front pages. More than 10,000 comments were posted in
response to Xiamen Wave’s article, and it registered a click
rate of nearly 57,000, as thousands of Xiamen residents were
circulating the same SMS message. The text message read:
[T]he Xianglu Group has invested in a PX project in Haicang
District. Should this highly toxic chemical product be
manufactured, it would be like dropping an atomic bomb on
Xiamen Island; it would mean that, in the future, the people
of Xiamen would live in the shadow of leukemia and deformed
children. We want to live....when you see this SMS please sent it
to all of your friends in Xiamen! (Lan and Zhang, 2007)
On 28 May 2007, in response to the online activity, the Chief
of the Environment Protection Bureau of Xiamen responded
to questions on the potential environmental problems in
the Xiamen Daily. The next day, the general manager of
the Xiamen PX Project, Lin Yingzong, published an article
in the Xiamen Evening Newspaper, explaining the safety
measures being taken by the PX project. During a brief news
conference on 30 May, Xiamen’s first Deputy Mayor, Ding
Guoyan, announced that the construction of the PX project
would be postponed and that the Xiamen government would
begin a process of public consultation, including the use of
the mayor’s hot line, email, text messaging, telephone, fax,
and post in order to obtain the views of citizens.
Nevertheless, many residents were dissatisfied with the
Xiamen government’s response, arguing that officials were
more concerned with public relations than a change in policy.
Many netizens received messages issued from a popular
local bulletin board system (BBS), Xiaoyu Community online,
which called for a ‘walk’ (San Bu) to the City Hall. However,
on 30 May, access to the Xiaoyu BBS was blocked with a
notification which read: “[T]he community is temporarily
closed for a program upgrade”. According to one user of
the Xiaoyu Community BBS, they had all received an email
from the BBS administrator that instructed them not to post
anything related to the PX project.
9
Nevertheless, and possibly caused if not inspired by this
effort to block communication, information about the walk
continued to be widely distributed and the demonstration
proceeded as planned. On 1 June 2007, many citizens
demonstrated in the city centre under the supervision
6. “The cries of residents of Xiamen city, Fujian province — please save our rights to live!” blog.sina.com.cn/haicangpx> [Accessed: 24
December, 2010], English translation is available at: alvoicesonline.org/2007/04/07/china-inner-city-toxics-plant-protested/>
[Accessed: 24 December, 2010]
7. The article was entitled “Anti-pollution! Xiamen million residents, let’s send out the same SMS”. The original one has been deleted online,
and a part of this article is available at: ws.163.com/07/1220/15/405QUSCN0001124J.html> [Accessed: 24 December, 2010]
8. Oeeee.com (Aoyi Wang), representing “omniscience-eye”, is operated by Nanfang Daily Media Group, one of the most influencing media
corporation in China. Beside Oeeee.com, the Group also runs Nanfang Daily, Southern Metropolitan Daily and Southern Weekend.
9. Ibid.
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of police. A few netizens posted live reports of the
demonstration on their blogs, using their mobile phones
and software to send text messages onto the Internet.
Traditional media, by contrast, were virtually silent about
the demonstration.
Wen Yunchao, known as Beifeng in his blog, and who was
participating in the protest, posted several live reports.
Conversations regarding the protest between Beifeng
and other netizens were extensive, running to over 9,000
Chinese characters. Most of the blog posts were short,
but they were vivid and conveyed detailed descriptions of
unfolding events: reporting where people were heading,
what banners participants were holding, what slogans
they were shouting, the estimated number of police
and participants, and the rumours of the government’s
response. They were circulating among participants
during the protest. For example, Wen Younchao wrote: “In
front of city hall”. – “I guess there are over ten thousand
people’- ‘No route was planned before, so it was a little bit
chaotic”.
10
And he argued that: “The development of the
new media technology has made it impossible to block all
the information”.
11
On the 1 and 3 June 2007, the Xiamen government
broadcasted mass text messages to all citizens, announcing
that the PX project had been postponed and that the
government would soon provide more information channels
in order to hear the views of residents, such as via cell phones
and the Internet. Then, on 7 June, the Xiamen government
said that whether or not to continue construction of the PX
project would be determined through another environmental
assessment.
Six months later, on 5 December 2007, the environmental
assessment report concluded that the Haicang District was
too small to have both a petrochemical plant, particularly
when sited near a residential area. Three days later, the
Xiamen government opened a voting platform on its website
– but it was taken down after only one day. When the poll
was closed on the following day, 55,376 of the 58,454 votes
cast were against the project. However, the managers of the
website dismissed the overwhelmingly negative vote, saying
they had neglected to take account of the fact that multiple
votes might come from the same IP address. It did not accept
the vote and abandoned the idea of polling residents.
On 13 and 14 December, the Xiamen government held two
separate meetings inviting representatives of the Xiamen
residents to discuss the PX project. Over 80 percent of
the participants voted against the PX project during the
meetings. Finally, on 16 December 2007, the PX project was
suspended by the authorities. Rather than being stopped,
it was announced that the project would be moved to
Zhangzhou, a neighbouring city to Xiamen in Fujian.
Holding News Media to Account:
the Nanjing Gas Explosion
On 28 July 2010, in Nanjing, the capital of Jiangsu
Province, a pipe burst that was carrying flammable gas.
The leak exploded at 10.15 am when the leaking gas was
ignited by a kitchen flame at a nearby restaurant (Yang and
Shangguan, 2010). The explosion was said to be the largest
recorded since 1949, and could be felt 10 kilometres away
(Wang and Luan, 2010). The next day, after investigation
of the incident, the police downplayed it and blamed
the explosion on a construction company that failed to
meet necessary building safety standards.
12
According to
an official of the State Administration for Work Safety,
“due to illegal sub-contracting and lack of supervision,
the construction did not meet safety standards” (Toloken
and Sun, 2010).
Reports on the incident by several local newspapers
contained a number of inconsistencies that were challenged
by netizens (Ju, Hu and Wang, 2011). One blogger, ‘Nanjing
Lao Cui’, took photos of the front pages of six local
newspapers on 29 July and posted them on his blog (Nanjing
Lao Cui, 2010). As his blog argued, the press tended to bury
news coverage of the event. His blog showed that only one
paper, Modern Express, a newspaper run by a national
news agency, reported the explosion, but placed it on the
10. Full text of live report is on Wen Yunchao’s blog, available at: .bullogger.com/blogs/wenyc1230/archives/69959.aspx> [Accessed:
25 December, 2010].
11. Wen Yunchao, word document with title of “Xiamen from Beginning to End” attached to email entitled “re: Xiamen PX Project” to Sun
Huan, 11 November, 2010. Cited with permission.
12. Multiple companies were involved in the construction, and in this case, a qualified contractor signed a subcontract with a company, which
caused the explosion, and was judged as unqualified.
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back cover. No other major newspaper in the city had the
explosion in a featured position, such as on their front or
back page. Nanjing MorningNews, which is attached to
Xinhua Daily and owned by the provincial party committee,
did not refer to the explosion at all in its first six pages.
Nanjing Daily,Yangtze Evening News and Jinling Evening
News all led with news of a plane crash in Pakistan, and
photos of the plane crash occupied over half of the Nanjing
Daily’s front page.
However, online networks developed the story of the
explosion, with pictures of the explosion diffusing rapidly
online. Unlike the delayed and inconsistent newspaper
reports, netizens were quick to cover the incident by using
the Internet, blogs, and other ICTs, with much coverage on
micro-blogs available within an hour of the explosion. Then,
a report of the explosion, which included video and pictures,
was posted on a BBS, which was soon cross-posted on many
other major BBSs in China, such as one entitled, “Big Blast
in the North of Nanjing”.
13
There was no official report about the number of people
who were injured by the explosion. However, the hospitals in
Nanjing announced that they had run out of blood supplies
in the aftermath of the explosion and were in urgent need
of donors. A tweet that encouraged Nanjing residents to
donate blood was cross-posted over 5000 times (He, 2010).
Perhaps the most incredible instance was when bloggers
shared a video clip within which a government official was
seen to have interrupted the live reporting of the explosion
on the Jiangsu City Channel.
14
He was reported to have said:
“Who gave you permission to broadcast live?” This question
was circulated widely on the Internet (Tan 2010, p. A08).
This is one of the only concrete statements coming from
a government official, but it spoke volumes. Most of the
traditional broadcast media kept silent the next day, but
the explosion continued to be discussed on the following
day and long after on many local BBSs and microblogs
(He, 2010).
In the aftermath of the explosion, a news article, entitled
‘Governmental Journalism in Crisis’, was published in
the People’s Daily by Ye Hao (2010), the minister of the
public relations department of Nanjing. Essentially, he
acknowledged that every citizen can be a journalist in
the era of the Internet, and argued that blocking media
coverage is wrong and ineffective in the digital age. Ye Hao
specifically noted that: “After a crisis, we used to fear the
media would bring chaos, leading to public panic and that
it would create a negative image of the government, but in
fact it is exactly the opposite”. Taking the Nanjing explosion
as an example, he said that well before the government had
time to send a press release, false and misleading rumours
had already been spread widely online. His argument
was that if the government were to publish information
as soon as possible, even in real-time, there would be a
greater likelihood of diminishing unfounded rumours and
misinformation. Every incident, according to Ye Hao, has
been teaching the government to be more sophisticated in
handling information, and that it should move toward more
open disclosure of information as its standard approach
(Ye, 2010).
Holding Public Officials Accountable:
Challenging a Publicly Funded Visit
On 3 June 2009, bloggers posted more than ten internal
government documents regarding a public-funded overseas
visit by six officials from the Guangzhou Maritime Court
(Ye 2009, p. 7).The documents included: a request to the
foreign affairs office of Guangzhou People’s government; a
report of the tour to South Africa and other countries; and
the record of a conversation held on an intranet platform.
According to the report, from 7 January to 18 January, 2009,
six officials of the court took an eleven-day study trip to
survey developments in South Africa, Egypt, and Turkey via
the United Arabic Emirates.
15, 16
During the trip, they spent
RMB 480,000 (over US $75,000). It was argued that this
expense claim was much higher than the regular travel
expenses for travel to those countries, but the documents
13. “Big Blast in the North of Nanjing”, 28 July, 2010, posted on Sina BBS, available at: ttp://nj.bbs.house.sina.com.cn/thread-5118927-1.html>
[Accessed: 27 December, 2010]
14. “A Chinese Official Disallowed Live Broadcasting While on Live TV”, 28 July, 2010, video file, available at: .youtube.com/
watch?v=-ffp5V_HTEE> [Accessed: 27 December, 2010].
15. “How The Member Make Up The Aboard Study Report”, June 3rd, 2009, available at: www.tianya.cn/publicforum/content/
free/1/1581756.shtml> [Accessed: 3 January 2011].
16. How The Member Make Up The Aboard Study Report”, June 3rd, 2009, available at: publicforum/content/free/1/1581756.
shtml> [Accessed: 3 January 2011].
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also raised questions over whether the purpose of the trip
was accurately reported.
One of the documents posted online described the
importance and urgency of the visit, justifying it by stating:
“in recent years, judicial cases related to oil pollution at
sea have been increasing, with lots of victims, high claims
of compensation and more related to foreign affairs… oil
contamination and land-based pollution are great threats
to sea, beach and harbour, which has a great impact on
residents’ lives, arousing intense public concern. Resolving
marine pollution disputes has a major impact on protection
of the marine environment, development of the marine
economy, and protection of people’s legal rights”. Therefore,
the report wrote, “Our court plans to accept the invitation
from courts of Johannesburg, South Africa, and an
association of lawyers in Cairo, Egypt, and local courts in
Istanbul, Turkey, to conduct research during a 12 day trip”.
The group planned to conduct research on “how to
understand and enforce international conventions when
dealing with oil spill and pollution cases; understand their
domestic legal systems, clarify jurisdiction over marine
pollution, identify appropriate application of law and
statutes on particular subjects; and the subjects of liability,
damage assessment, insurance and payment, arbitration of
oil pollution cases, and the functions of organizations, such
as the Cairo lawyers association, etc”.
These were legitimate aims, but netizens drew attention
to the report of this trip as lacking genuine findings or
insights on the matters that were used to justify the travel.
Much of the report described the basic geography of the
countries, which was far from the purpose of their mission
and available without travelling to these locations. Some
highlighted that the report had simply copied extracts of
text from other articles, and they underlined sentences that
bloggers suspected to have been simply cut and pasted
from newspaper articles or induction materials given by
various overseas agencies. Several activist netizens also
revealed more information about these officials, which
raised questions about the adequacy of their resumes and a
number of controversial cases that they had been in charge
of resolving.
Most telling was that the report had no explicit description of
“maritime oil pollution and land-based pollution problems”.
Instead it wrote: “in Johannesburg we visited the District
Court. The Chief Judge gave us a warm reception and invited
us to attend the trial he is in charge of”; “In the outskirts
of Cairo we saw rivers full of garbage”; and in Istanbul, “we
visited a local court, and attended the hearings”. In addition,
one blog-post showed the conversation on an intranet
platform between members of the court. One official left
a message for another saying, “I have searched for a long
time but did not find detailed information on the ship oil
pollution lawsuit in South Africa and other two countries.
Sorry, I have to send it like this…” suggesting that much of
the research was desk or Internet research, and not done on
the ground or in ways that required a visit of the delegation.
On 10 June 2009, the Court held a news conference stating
that “this overseas visit went through a strict process of
application in accordance with the time, route and agenda,
and was approved by higher level officials”. It also stated
that “the cost of this visit, RMB 480,000, did not exceed
the budget” (Hong and Liang 2009). These responses led to
another round of critiques, which lasted for several months.
On 15 October 2009, Luo Guohua, Chief Judge of Guangzhou
Maritime Court, was fired.
Cross-Cutting Patterns and Themes
These mini-cases reveal clear illustrations of how networked
individuals – netizens – can play a Fifth Estate role. Netizens
were able to source information, network with others, and
widely distribute information that challenged more powerful
institutions and actors. By speaking and networking the
truth in ways that countered misinformation and politically
oriented communication strategies, netizens were able
to hold government agencies, mass media, and judicial
agencies accountable in ways that influenced real decisions
and actions. While limited to three mini-cases, the role of
netizens were so obviously instrumental in each case that it
is clear that networked individuals in China can – on occasion
– provide a basis for more democratic accountability.
This section briefly describes a number of patterns and
themes across these cases that help illuminate the political
dynamics of the Fifth Estate and the role of what might be
called the semi-sovereign netizen.
The Role of a Fifth Estate in Enhancing
Democratic Accountability
First, the cases all illustrate how networked individuals were
able to source their own information, independent of the press
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and the state’s apparatus, and also network with like-minded
individuals in ways that could hold other institutions more
accountable. The press might be state-controlled, but when
it failed to report events or cover key issues that could be
demonstrably seen online, then its credibility was weakened.
In Nanjing, when netizens photographed the impact of the gas
explosion and distributed it globally, its importance could not
be denied. Likewise, the official accounts of the Guangzhou
Maritime Court were discredited by bloggers who critically
looked at the reports of the agency, and the concerns raised
by bloggers were corroborated through multiple sources.
In such ways, even in China, despite controls on the press
and Internet users, these cases provide evidence of the
emergence of a Fifth Estate of networked individuals, capable
of enhancing the accountability of major institutional actors.
In fact, each one illustrated that efforts to exert state
control tended to have the exact opposite effect– the so-
called Streisand effect. The American entertainer, Barbara
Streisand, sought to suppress information about her home,
only to magnify its coverage online (Greenberg, 2007).
In each of the three cases, there were clear attempts to
suppress or limit coverage by the press, which might well
have contributed in part to the vitality of online exposure.
Censorship in the digital age can ‘backfire’ (Cacciottolo,
2012), in part because of the role of a Fifth Estate.
Dynamics of Reframing Issues and the Scope
of Debate
Secondly, netizens did reframe discussion of each of
the three events. One of the most critical aspects of
Schattschneider’s (1960) perspective on the dynamics of
political conflicts is the role of that agenda-setting and
issue-framing can play in the outcome of political conflict.
As Schattschneider argued, the most important strategy
of politics is to control the scope of conflict. As he (1960,
p. 105) put it: “Whoever decides what the game is about,
decides also who can get into the game”. In each case, the
success of networked individuals was tied to their ability to
challenge official accounts – or lack of official accounts –
with information that reframed the issue at stake. In each
case, this reframing changed the scope of the debate and
the political dynamics of the event.
Agenda-setting has been a focus of research on the media in
China. For example, Jonathan Hassid (2012) has examined a
number of case studies to assess the role of blogging, asking
whether blogs increase or decrease political tensions. He
found that the impact of blogging depended on whether
bloggers led or followed the mass media agenda. If bloggers
initiated issues, they tended to raise tensions, while they
reduced tensions when they followed the press agenda. We
did not focus on leading or following media coverage, but
on whether networked individuals, which include but are
not only bloggers, reframed the issues. We have sought to
put the impact of blogging into a bigger picture, focused
on the role of a Fifth Estate.
For example, the cases show that discussion of the PX
chemical plant was shifted from a source of local jobs and
economic development to a public health hazard. There was
sufficient consensus early in the process for the construction
to be launched with approval by key agencies as an economic
development milestone for Xiamen. However, opposition by
local media, experts, including reputable scientists, bloggers,
and protesters, whose actions were orchestrated in part
through the Web-based campaign, shifted the issue from
economic benefit to an environmental and health hazard
for the local community.
In Nanjing, blogs and social media discussion of the gas
explosion in Nanjing rapidly reconfigured debate by making
what was framed as a routine investigation of the failure of
a construction company to follow proper standards, to be
recast as a cover up of a serious explosion and resulting
safety issues. This created a major issue over the credibility
of the press and the competence of public officials in
protecting public safety, implying they had something to
hide. Rather than control rumours and contain conflict,
restrictions redefined the issue and the contestants.
Similarly, by challenging the expense claims of officials in the
Guangzhou Maritime Court, bloggers reframed a story about
officials on a study visit to investigate practices in other
countries, to be seen as involved in a wasteful ‘boondoggle’,
if not an official scandal over misleading expense claims for
a holiday. Anti-corruption resonated with a broad public.
How the Internet Supports the Role
of Netizens
A number of factors contributed to the ability of the Internet
to support the Fifth Estate role of netizens in these cases.
The Limits of Filtering and Control of Netizens
Networked individuals – Netizens – were able to overcome
efforts to filter and block information in ways that enabled
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them to source critical information and locate others who
had similar concerns. The stark example is Nanjing, where
bloggers posted information about the gas explosion
within an hour of the explosion, accompanied by graphic
photographs and videos of the aftermath. Even more
dramatic was the video clip shared online of an official
interrupting a live TV channel claiming that the station did
not have permission to broadcast about the event. As noted
above, in these cases, the Streisand effect was real. Efforts
to censure tended to raise the profile of the event, and the
legitimacy of the information provided online.
Episodes of Contagion: Striking a Popular Chord
Issues were identified that struck a chord with netizens,
evidenced by the rapid spread of support, what Shattschneider
called contagion. For instance, tweets went viral around the
need for donations of blood after the Nanjing explosion. The
Web-orchestrated campaign in Xiamen led to a huge popular
vote and turnouts at meetings in opposition to the project.
Moreover, an impact on contagion could be evidenced by
the sheer level of online activity. In this way, the Internet
not only enabled many people to easily make very limited
expressions of support, but also provided social information
and was likely to have reinforced the depth and scale of
support for the issue to engage a critical mass of citizens in
each case. Netizens could see online and in public forums and
protests that others shared their views. However, the degree
to which an issue can capture the public’s attention is difficult
to gauge in advance, as well as its failure in most cases,
given the degree to which these cases are exceptions to the
norm. Nevertheless, they show the democratic potential of
the Internet as a tool for accountability, which can cause
institutions to anticipate this potential and therefore self-
regulate themselves to avoid embarrassment or censure.
Protecting the Safety and Anonymity
of Netizens
Netizens felt safe to participate online. Whether it was a case
of safety in numbers or a sense of anonymity, netizens were
told they were safe, and felt safe enough from retribution,
that they were able to participate online and in live protests.
In the case of the PX campaign, repeated messages
reassured netizens that it was safe to express their views
online, underscoring the significance of this perception.
One factor contributing to the safety of netizens was the
degree that the Fifth Estate creates a moving target. Actions
by the Fifth Estate are difficult to sustain overtime, because
they are not institutionalized. In these cases, however,
sustainability was not an issue. In each case, netizens were
able to reframe the issue rapidly and build on the mobilization
of a sizeable public to effect change in a short period of time.
It was not necessary to sustain their campaign for extended
periods, which could have reversed their gains and enabled
the government to undermine their role. And because these
Fifth Estate actions can arise spontaneously and then
disappear when the issue is engaged, they are difficult if
not impossible to control. There is no institution to repress.
Social Movements as Only One Strategy
of the Fifth Estate
Similarly, the cases also illustrate that the Fifth Estate is
distinct from a social movement. Networked individuals can
hold government and the press more accountable even if
acting in their individual capacities. The Fifth Estate is not
equivalent to a social movement. A political movement did
arise around the PX project, leading to some local protests,
but social movements were not central to either of the other
cases. A movement is one of many potential strategies of
networked individuals, as they redefine the issue and the
scope of the conflict. This distinction helps underline the
point that the ability to source information and networks
could lead to social movements, but not necessarily. The
empowerment of networked individuals, for example, could
undermine a social movement, such as by challenging the
narrative of its leadership, correcting misinformation, and
preventing the spread of false rumours.
Summary and Conclusion
The Fifth Estate concept captures the democratic potential
of the Internet to be used in ways that create new forms of
more pluralistic accountability. Even in China, with a record
of efforts to control media and information technologies, it
is possible to find dramatic evidence of how a Fifth Estate
role can be played by networked individuals.
This concept is valuable by moving away from conventional
views of e-democracy, which view the Internet as a tool for
transforming democratic institutions, such as parliamentary
consultation or elections. Instead, the Internet can support the
empowerment of individuals with access to and skills in the use
of this technology. It can be used to enhance the communicative
power of individuals through a variety of strategies, such
as enabling netizens to reframe political controversy.
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China and the Fifth Estate: Net Delusion or Democratic Potential?
Eloi PuigEloi Puig
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William H. Dutton, Sun Huan, Weiwei Shen
Decades ago, E. E. Schattschneider used the concept of
the semi-sovereign people to counter idealistic models of
representative democracy, often anchored in assumptions
about a large proportion of the public being knowledgeable
and aware of most issues, and representatives reflecting
the weight of public opinion. In the same way, debate
over digital democracy continues to be shaped by ideal
models of democracy, suggesting that the Internet enables
politics to move toward these ideal models, illustrating the
potential relevance of Schattschneider’s counter-models
based on more realistic models of pluralist democracy.
One element of his formulation assumes that people get
involved intermittently, primarily around conflicts (issues),
and controlling the scope of conflicts – such as by defining
the issues – is the central strategy of politics.
Netizens, such as by creating and sourcing their own
information resources, can undermine the ability of
authorities to control the definition of conflicts and the
subsequent scope of conflicts. They represent another
source of authority in a more pluralist process and thereby
can alter the dynamics and outcome of the political process.
It is this more limited albeit more realistic role of the public
that gives rise to the concept of the semi-sovereign people.
Similarly, netizens acting as a Fifth Estate cannot approach
the power and authority of the state and other institutional
authorities, but they can sometimes surface new information,
independently of key institutional actors, redefine issues
and effect meaningful change in the scope and outcome of
politics by independently sourcing information and networks.
However, the case studies explored here also highlight
limitations of the Fifth Estate. First, these are exceptional
cases. In most instances, netizens have not succeeded in
challenging state policy and the state controlled press
coverage of events. The Fifth Estate does not routinely
provide a source of democratic accountability, but has
presented the potential to do so. That said, this possibility
of accountability can have an important influence on
institutions that recognize this democratic potential.
Secondly, the role of the Fifth Estate is not necessarily
optimal for all stakeholders as it can be redistributive in
creating unanticipated negative consequences, such as in
blocking the PX plant, but leading it to be moved to another
locale. Of course, this is true of any successful political action
– the potential to result in unintended or unanticipated
negative consequences or spill-over effects.
Nevertheless, these dramatic cases of netizens changing the
dynamics of public issues in China illustrate the possibility
for a Fifth Estate role to emerge even in the context of
a state controlled media. This underscores the need for
more comparative case studies of Fifth Estate activities in
China and other nations with more and less considerable
state regulation of the press and the Internet in order to
further develop the themes and patterns identified by this
study. This article provides some evidence that the Fifth
Estate could hold out a promise for taking studies of the
Internet in China beyond the agenda setting framework,
by placing agenda-setting within a more comprehensive
political framework. While these exceptional cases do not
validate our theoretical perspective, they do reinforce the
viability of the concept of the Fifth Estate as a framework for
understanding the political dynamics of the Internet in nations
that are not liberal democratic regimes with a free press.
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Recommended citation
DUTTON, William H.; SUN, Huan; SHEN, Weiwei (2015). “China and the Fifth Estate: Net Delusion or
Democratic Potential?”. IN: Joan BALCELLS, Albert BATLLE, Albert PADRÓ-SOLANET (coord.). “The
impact of social media in politics and public administrations” [online monograph]. IDP. Revista de Internet,
Derecho y Política. No. 20, pp. 6-24. UOC [Accessed: dd/mm/yy]
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About the author
William H. Dutton
wdutton@msu.edu
William H. Dutton is the Quello Professor of Media and Information Policy in the College of Communication
Arts and Sciences at MSU, where he is Director of the Quello Center. Bill was the first Professor of Internet
Studies at the University of Oxford where he was founding director of the Oxford Internet Institute, and
a Fellow of Balliol College.
Quello Center
406 Communication Arts Building
Michigan State University
East Lansing, MI 48824-1212 USA
Huan Sun
sunnyhuanny@gmail.com
Huan Sun is a research associate with ESO Fund. She holds a master’s degree in Comparative Media
Studies from Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Her undergraduate degree is in Journalism from
Tsinghua University, China.
523 Lake Blvd
Emerald Hills, CA 94062
USA
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China and the Fifth Estate: Net Delusion or Democratic Potential?
Eloi PuigEloi Puig
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William H. Dutton, Sun Huan, Weiwei Shen
Weiwei Shen
tonyshenww@gmail.com
Weiwei Shen is an SJD student at the University of Pennsylvania Law School,where he joined as a Dean’s
Scholar and was the recipient of the Wither LLP Scholarship. He also holds a JM degree from Tsinghua
University and an MSc degree from University of Oxford.
3501 Sansom Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA
