Bibliografía

Autor:Iñigo Zavala Ortiz De La Torre
Páginas:455-497
 
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Page 455

1. Autores

Adams, Edward S. y John H. Matheson. «A statutary model for corporate constituency concerns». Emory LawJournal 49 (2000): 1085-1138. Agle, Bradley R., Thomas Donaldson, R. Edward Freeman, Michael C.

Jensen, Ronald K. Mitchell, Donna J. Wood. «Dialogue: towards superior stakeholder theory». BusinessEthics Quarterly 18 (2008): 153-190. Agrawal, Ashwini K. «Corporate governance objectives of labor unión shareholders: evidence from proxy voting». New York University, http://archive.nyu.edu/bitstream/245 l/27848/2/wpa08006.pdf. Alchian, Armen A. y Harold Demsetz. «Production information costs, and economic organization». The American Economic Review 62 (1972) 5: 777-798. Alexander, Cindy R., Mark A. Chen, Duane J. Seppi, y Chester S. Spatt. «The ro\e of advisory servicesmproxy voting». NBERWorking Paper ng. 15143 (julio 2009). http://www.nber.org/papers/wl5143 Alien, William T. «Contracts and communities in corporate law». Washington and Lee Law Review 50, issue 4 (1993): 1395-1407.

Our schizophrenic conception of the business Corporation

. Cardozo Law Review (1992)14: 261-281. Alien, Franklin y Douglas Gale. Comparing financial systems. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2000. Amihud, Yacob y Baruch Lev, «Risk reduction as a managerial motive for conglomérate mergers». Bell Journal ofEconomics 12 (1981): 605-617. Anabtawi Imán, y Lynn Stout. «Fiduciary duties for activist shareholders».

Stanford Law Review 60 (2008): 1255-1309.

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Anderson, Ronald, Saltar Mansi y David Reeb. «Executive behavior: a creditor perspective on managerial ownership». En Corporate governance a synthesis oftheory, research, and practice. Eds. H. Kent Baker y Ronald Anderson, 427-450. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, 2010. Andrés, Christian, André Betzer, Mark Goergen y Daniel Metzger, «Corporate governance systems». En Corporate governance a synthesis oftheory, research, and practice. Eds. H. Kent Baker y Ronald Anderson, 37-56.

Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, 2010. Arcuri, Alessandra. «Eclecticism in law and economics». Erasmus Law Review 1(2008): 59-81. Armour, John y Michael Whincop. «The property foundations of corporate law». Oxford Journal ofLegal Studies 27 (2007): 429-465. Armour, John, Bernard S. Black y Brian Cheffins. «Delaware's balancing act».

Indiana Law Journal 87, issue 4 (2012): 1345-1405. Ashraf, Rasha, Narayanan Jayaraman y Harley E. Ryan, Jr. «Conflicts of interest and mutual fund proxy voting: Evidence from shareholder proposals on executive compensation». Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 47, n^ 3 (2012): 567-588. Auerbach, Alan y David Reishus. «The impact of taxation on mergers and acquisitions», 69-86. En Mergers and acquisitions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988. Bainbridge,StephenM.«Amapofmodelbusiness Corporation Act states». http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2013/ll/a-map-of-model-business-corporation-act-states.html.

Community and statism: a conservative contractarian critique of progressive corporate law scholarship

. Cornell Law Review 82 (mayo 1997):856-906. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.10335.

Corporate governance after definancial crisis. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.

Corporate law. 2- ed. New York: Foundation Press, 2009.

Director primacy: the means and ends of corporate governance

.

Northwestern University Law Review 97 (2003): 547-606.

Dodd-Frank: quack federal corporate governance round II

. Minnesota Law Review 95 (2011): 1779-1821.

- «Interpreting nonshareholders constituency statutes». Pepperdine Law Review 19 (1.992): 971-1028.

- Mergers and adquisitions. 3- ed. New York: Foundation Press, 2012.

- «Shareholder activism and institutional investors». University of California, Sc/joo/o/Low, UCLASchoolofLaw-Econ Research paper,nQ 05-02(2005).

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- «Shareholder activism in the Obama era» (2009). http://ssrn.com/ abstract=1437791,1.

- «The case for limited shareholders voting rights», UCLA Law Review 53 (2006): 601-636.

The politics of corporate governance: Roe's strong management, weak owners

, Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy, 18 (1995): 673-733.

The new corporate governance in theory and practice. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.

The scope of the SECs authority over shareholders voting rights

. SEC http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-537/4537-17.pdf.

The shortlife and resurrection of SEC Rule 19c-4

. Washington University

Law Quarterly 69 (1991): 565-634. Bainbridge, Stephen y Todd Henderson. «Boards -R- us: reconceptualizing corporate boards». StanfordLaw Review 66 (2014):1051-1121. Baird, Douglas G. y Robert K. Rasmussen. «Prívate debt and the missing lever of corporate governance». University of Pennsylvania Law Review 154 (2006): 1209-1251. Baker, H. Kenty Ronald Anderson. Corporate governance: a synthesis of theory, research, and practice. Eds. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, 2010. Baldwin, Robert, Martin Cave y Martin Lodge. Understanding regulation.

Theory, strategy, and practice. 2- ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012. Barry Jordán, M. John William Hatfieldy ScottDuke Kominers. «On derivative markets and social welfare: a theory of empty voting and hidden ownership». Virginia Law Review 99 (2013): 1103-1168. Barzuza, Michael. «The state of state antitakeover law». Virginia Law Review 95 (2009): 1973-2052. Baysinger, Barry D. y Robert E. Hokisson. «The composition of board of directors and strategic control: effects on corporate strategy». Academy of Management Review 15 (1990)l: 72-87. Baysinger, Barry D. y Henry N. Butler. «The role of corporate law in the theory of the ftrm». Journal of Law and Economics 28 (1985): 179-191. Beasley Mark S. «An empirical analysis of the relation between the board of directors composition and financialstatementfraud».i4ccount;ngi?ev;ew 71 (1996)4: 443-465. Becht, Marco, Patrick Bolton y Ailsa Roel. «Corporate governance and control».

European Corporate Governance Institute. Finance Working Paper n°. 02 (2002): 1-124. Bebchuk, Lucían. «The case for increasing shareholder power». Harvard Law Review 118, issue 3 (2005): 833-914.

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Bebchuk, Lucían A., Alón Brav y Wei Jiang. «The long term effects of hedge fund activism». Columbio Law Review (forthcoming, 2015): 114. Bebchuk, Lucían. «The myth of the shareholder franchise». Virginia Law Review 93 (2007): 675-732. - «The myth that insulating boards serves long term valué». Columbio Law Review 113 (2013): 1637-1694. Benchuk, Lucían, Alma Cohén y Alien Ferrell. «What matters in corporate governance?». The Review offinancial studies 22 (2009): 783-827. Bebchuk, Lucían A., Alón Brav y Wei Jiang. «The long term effects of hedge fund activism». Columbio Law Review (forthcoming, 2015): 1085-1156. Belinfanti, Támara C. «The proxy adviser and corporate governance industry: the case for increased oversight and control». Stanford Journal ofLaw, Business & Finance 14, nQ 22 (2009): 1-56. Berchmans Vallet de Goytisolo, Juan. Manuales de Metodología Jurídica I.

Manual introductorio a las Metodologías del Derecho. Madrid: Fundación cultural del notariado, 2004.

Berle, Adolf A. Power without property. New York: Hardcourt Brace, 1959. Berle, Adolf A. y Gardiner C. Means. The modern Corporation and prívate property. Ed., 2009. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction, 1932. Berle, Adolf A. Studies in the law of corporate finance. Ed.,1985. Buffalo, New York: Williams S. Hein, 1928. Bhagat, Sanjai, Brian Bolton y Roberta Romano. «The promise and peril of corporate governance índices». Columbio Law Review 108 (2008): 1803-1882. Bisconti, Anthony. «The double bottom line: can constituency statutes protect socially responsible corporations stuck in Revlon Land?». Loyola Los Angeles Law Review 42 (2009): 765-808. Birdthistle, William A. «Compensation power: an analisys of rents and rewards in the mutual funds industry». Tulane Law Review 80 (2006): 1401-1465. Bishop, John D. «For-profit corporations in a just society: A social conduct argument concerning the rights and responsibilities of corporations».

BusinessEthics Quarterly 18, issue 2 (2008): 191-212. Black, Bernard S. «Agents watching agents: the promise of institutional investor voice». UCLA Law Review 39, nQ 4 (1992): 811-893.

Corporate law and residual claimants

(partial draft). Stanford Law andEconomics Olin Working Paper (mayo 2001): 1-45. http://ssrn.com/abstract=1528437.

Is corporate law trivial?: a political and economic analysis

. Northwestern University Law Review (1990)84: 542-597.

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Blair, Margaret M. «Corporate personhood and the corporate persona». University ofIllinois Law Review (2013): 785-820.

- «Reforming corporate governance. What history can teach us». Berkeley Business Law Journal 1 (2004): 1-183.

Blair, Margaret M. y Lynn A. Stout. «A team production theory of corporate law». Virginia Law Review 85 (1999): 247-328. Birdthistle, William A. «Compensation power: an analisys of rents and rewards in the mutual funds industry». Tulane Law Review 80 (2006): 1401-1465. Blodgett, Richard. «Union pensión fund assetmanagement». En Abuse on Wall Street: conflicts ofinterest on the securities markets. New York: Preager, 1980: 329-334. Boatright, John R. «Contractors as stakeholders: reconciling stakeholders theory with the nexus of contracts firm». Journal of Banking and Finance 26 (2002): 1837-1852.

- «Fiducuary duties and the shareholder-managementrelation: or what's so especial about shareholders?». Business Ethics Quarterly 4 (1994): 393-407.

Bottomley Stephen. The constitutional Corporation. Burlington, Vermont: Ashgate, 2008. Bradley Michael, Cindy A. Schipani, Anant K. Sundaram y James P. Walsh.

The purposes and accountability of the Corporation in contemporary society: corporate governance at a crossroads

. Law and Compemporary problems 62 (1999): 9-87. Brandéis, Louis D...

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