Resumen
Este artículo analiza el contexto histórico, político, social, religioso y humano que rodea el terrorismo yihadista suicida en Indonesia. En él se presta una atención especial al discurso legitimador de los atentados suicidas. Se explora la mente de los candidatos a mártires y, por último, se estudian las condiciones operacionales de las acciones terroristas.
Palabras clave: terrorismo, jihadismo, grupo Al Jemaah al Islamiya. This article analyzes the historical, political, social, religious and human context surrounding jihadist suicide terrorism in Indonesia. Particular attention is paid to the legitimate discussion of suicide attacks. The mind of the potential martyrs and the operational conditions of jihadist terrorism are also explored. Key Words: Terrorism, Jihadism, Al Jemaah al Islamiya (JI) Group.Ver el contenido completo de este documento
Extracto
Terrorismo suicida en Indonesia
«Other people seek life, then they die. We seek death, then we have a better life forever.» Imam Samudra, AlJemaah Al Islamiya's (JI) Bali bombing mastermind commenting on the philosophy of martyrdom. 1. Introduction One evening in a remote hilly area in Banten, Indonesia, in October 2005, a closing ceremony was held to mark the conclusion of an AlJemaah Al Islamiya (JI) training course conducted for Indonesians, Malaysians and Pattani Muslims.1 An electric generator lighted the venue and the meeting lasted from 7-9 in the evening. It was not the first time JI had conducted training in Banten, a well-known JI hub.2 Addressing the gathering, a JI leader said: «The time for jihad has arisen. We can see clearly that our enemies America and its Allies are hanging around us. Americans have killed not only combatants but also the civilian women and children. So it is time to strike them back in every place we can find them back. At least one of you can kill two Americans. At its best, one of you can kill ten. In order to kill them, it is inevitable that you will become a syahid... [martyr]»3«But we do not have enough bombs. Not all of you can attain martyrdom [shahid]. So please be patient. Please wait a short time and pray to Allah so that we will soon have enough number of bombs or weapons. As the number of bombs currently available is 120, another 180 will not get the opportunity in future to attain martyrdom at this time.»4 Then the JI master of ceremonies announced 120 aliases of those who signed up as martyrs. As the rest had a good understanding of curriculum, they had volunteered to be trainers. Among the speakers at the event were Zulkarnean alias Daud, the military commander of JI, Noordin Mohamed Top, the JI strategist, Abu Amar, leader of JI faction, Abu Sidik, Mukhliansah, and Jaja.5 This single event demonstrated the nature and scale of threat, especially employing suicide attacks against Western targets in Southeast Asia. 1.1. The Context The politico-religious ideology of jihad has been growing steadfastly since Indonesia's return to democracy. In Southeast Asia, particularly in Indonesia, the chief proponent of this ideology is JI. Led by Abu Bakar Bashir, the JI is responsible for popularizing a politico-religious ideology of jihad and martyrdom. Also the leader of the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (The Indonesian Mujahidin Council), Bashir was imprisoned and he has been released in June 2006. Although Bashir has publicly disassociated himself with JI, he has not condemned the acts of violence perpetrated by JI members. Like Bashir, several ideologues of jihad have exploited the political space and the opportunity to portray martyrdom as the ultimate sacrifice. Nonetheless, the only group that has mounted suicide attacks in Indonesia is JI. Operationally and ideologically, JI is close to Al Qaeda. Like Al Qaeda, JI is of the view that the United States of America, its allies and friends are attacking Islam and Muslims. Therefore, JI ideologues state that it is their religious duty to wage jihad or holy war against the aggressor. Without exception, almost all the targets attacked by JI suicide bombers have been Western targets in Indonesia. Like Al Qaeda and other jihad groups, JI calls death in jihad as Syahadah or Istisyhad (martyrdom) and the person who die as shahid (martyr). In context, the usage of the terms «death» and «suicide» are forbidden.6 This study is based on interviews with JI leaders, members and supporters, intelligence debriefings, police interrogations and recoveries from JI and other jihadist safe houses. 2. Background JI is a breakaway group of Darul Islam (DI), a group that has steadfastly fought for the establishment of an Islamic state. The Darul Islam struggle, spearheaded by DI, the primordial group, started as a local jihad. After JI became operational in the 1990s, the threat began to shift from the near enemy to the distant enemy. The nationalist character of the Darul Islam struggle was gradually replaced by a powerful religious sentiment. The suicide bombers of Bali I referred to the Darul Islam struggle but the bombers were clearly driven by the idea of global jihad. For instance, Acong, one of the two Bali bombers in October 2002 said: There is plenty of work that needs to be done in the name of our struggle and pray today that my actions will grow to lay the seeds for the growth of the mujahids. Today I have proven that I am a son of DII/NII (Darul Islam Indonesia/Negara Indonesia Islam), who is ready...
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